

Critical Education

Volume 10 Number 6

March 15, 2019

ISSN 1920-4175

Ideology of Neo-fascism, Education, and Culture of Peace *The Empirical Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina*

Goran Basic
Linnaeus University

Zlatan Delić
University of Tuzla

Halima Sofradzija
University of Sarajevo

Citation: Basic, G., Delić, Z., Sofradzija, H. (2019). Ideology of neo-fascism, education, and culture of peace: The empirical case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Critical Education*, 10(6), 1-20. Retrieved from <http://ojs.library.ubc.ca/index.php/criticaled/article/view/186410>

Abstract

The aim of this article is to critically analyse intellectual conditions for education pertaining to the empirical and normative knowledge dimensions that can oppose the ideologies of neo-fascism. The analytical basis is a literature review of various studies from the domains of sociology of knowledge, war sociology, social epistemology, and critical pedagogy. The article explains the social need for better-quality public education pertaining to the meaning of political, media, and religious use and misuse of “identitarian concepts” and “identitarian terminology.” The privileged strategies of the political application of referential systems and mechanisms of ‘differentiating’ serve as the epistemic foundation to teach the concepts, terminology, taxonomies, and classifications used to separate people into “ours” and “theirs.” The genocide of Bosnian Bosniaks in the war against the Bosnian-Herzegovinian multicultural society conveys the need to create peaceful emancipatory identity politics and for a new pedagogy of emancipation of many of the oppressed and disenfranchised who are difficult to explicitly name. Conceptual problems, related to certain obvious paradoxes intrinsic in the politics of the collective representation of citizens after genocide, are linked to these processes.



Readers are free to copy, display, and distribute this article, as long as the work is attributed to the author(s) and *Critical Education*, it is distributed for non-commercial purposes only, and no alteration or transformation is made in the work. More details of this Creative Commons license are available from <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/>. All other uses must be approved by the author(s) or *Critical*

Education. *Critical Education* is published by the Institute for Critical Educational Studies and housed at the University of British Columbia. Articles are indexed by EBSCO Education Research Complete and Directory of Open Access Journal.

Modern states, as rationally ordered and regulated societies, have *repressive apparatuses* (government, administration, police, military, institutions of legislative coercion, prisons) through which they implement their legitimate ruling monopoly on the use of force.¹ They also have *ideological apparatuses*, educational institutions, institutions of cultural production and reproduction, academic and scientific institutions of interest for national and state progress and universal progress, institutions that value and maintain the customs and traditions of a people, and institutions that epitomise the special political and religious culture of a nation and a people, that take care of the symbolical imaginarium of the national and state power. Without the combined action of repressive and ideological apparatuses, the social process of integration and achieving common goals would not be possible (Kalanj, 2010, p. 35; Pütz, Neff-van Aertselaer, & Van Dijk 2004; Ravlić, 2013; Schwarzmantel, 2009). The question of the public action of *ideological state apparatuses* thus becomes a large problem in post-socialist states that flirt with the *ideologies of fascism*. It is enough to mention only the phenomenon of *institutionalised normalisation* of abnormal educational practices of mandatory segregation – that is, the separation of children in Bosnian-Herzegovinian schools exclusively by ethnical, clerical, and nationalist criteria – probably the most alarming example of institutionalised neo-fascism that exists in the form of an ideological apparatus in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Capitalism (also in post-war societies) acts by prioritising the financial power of capital and thus produces not only *prosperity* for the rich but *catastrophes* for the undeveloped and poor, which can be measured in millions of innocent victims (Freire, 1968). However, the care for or debt towards the victims of global and transitional violence² cannot be expressed by blaming only capitalism for all the evils of this world or blaming opposing political regimes that we call *totalitarian*: Beck calls the economic non-understanding of the link between economy, market, and security the *blindness of economy* (Beck, 2013: 23). Besides the *blindness of economy*, Bosnia and Herzegovina are also faced with the *blindness of the politics of representation* of their own citizens. If human diversity, plurality, openness – and uncertainty and the mystery of human identity, focused on the future – are reduced to just a single homogeneous determinant, whether national, ethnic, or religious, then we are dealing with a horrendous and *very dangerous identity reductionism* that creates ideal conditions for the proliferation of various forms of neo-fascism in the 21st century (Costa-Pinto & Kallis, 2014; Freire, 1968).

From the Bosnian-Herzegovinian perspective, it often seems that both Serbia and Croatia would not have hesitated to divide the land and cleanse it of Bosnians and Herzegovinians, even today, in 2019, had they won the war against the Bosnian-Herzegovinian society and state (Hromadžić, 2017). The competition for the *status of a victim* (Basic, 2015a) of the wars is today so strong that populism is becoming the most represented “worldview” and a programme of xenophobic acts towards others. *Bipolar passions of sports fans*, which aim to divide the whole world into “us” and “them”, are becoming popular again. Of course, it is understood that “we” are always correct and that “others” – that is, “they” – are always responsible for everything negative that has happened

¹ The study’s analysis was presented at the conferences, ‘The Second International Scientific Victimology Conference “Ambassadors of Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (Basic, Delić, & Sofradzija, 2017).

² With the concepts of “transitional violence”, “transitional justice”, “transitional pathology”, “transitional states”, “transitional economy”, “transitional crime” and “transitional peace” in this study means the phenomena that characterize the post-war societies. Transitional is a temporal concept, and applying to the period following the wars in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina transitioning to clerical nationalist neo-fascist states.

in the past or is happening today (Basic, 2018, 2017). These passions are so strong that their place as the true cause of whole nations falling into barbarism goes unnoticed even though it can already be perceived in the quasi-epistemological zones where we form the classification mechanisms of ourselves: in the *ways* we aim to explain *our* past, present, and future to children and adults. In the Balkans, under the influence of national myths and religiously inspired mythology, the programmes of Bible study, history, and historiography classes – even educational programmes of the so-called *cultural politics of identity* (Weber, Herb, Marsal, Dobashi, & Schweitzer 2011) – can easily turn into subtle replacements for pre-military training, into ideological-militaristic preparations for new *identity wars* that probably take place because only *others*, and never ourselves, are considered guilty for all the problems of humanity. The increasing unemployment, insecurity, and uncertainty of life contribute to the strengthening of *neo-fascist ideologies*, which often view wars as legitimate means of solving problems. Interpreting history as only a history of war means not viewing life in all its diversity and not perceiving that it cannot be reduced to a single form or manifestation.

The predatory interventions of Serbian and Croatian politics and politicians into the self-understanding of citizens living in Bosnia and Herzegovina are influenced by national myths and myths of “great states” and require new research approaches based on a *culture of peace* (Korostelina, 2012). While responsible intellectuals work on new discursive and identity possibilities of articulation and consideration of post-modern conceptions of European Union citizenship (Ivić, 2014, p. 11), politicians and powerful figures in former Yugoslav Republics have been playing with the fate of citizens for decades. The culture of peace should correspond to the epistemological and moral recovery of the ideologically damaged and manipulated knowledge about us and others. Social sciences should aim for new programmes of intelligent and self-sustaining *demographic revitalisation* (Martinez-Fernandez, Kubo, Noya, & Weyman, 2012) of rural and urban areas that have almost become abandoned. Neo-fascism would like to return the people to the time of medieval fortresses to conceal the crime of stealing public goods. Educational institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region should be saved from these agents of a single identity who have, in the name of mistakenly applied “protection of vital national interests”, dangerously undermined the balance of life in this part of the planet.

The Phenomenon of Knowledge, Religion, Law, and War Violence

Economists and politicians constantly repeat that “we live in a global society of knowledge and skills”, all the while forgetting that what they call “a global society of knowledge” does not represent the global awareness of the individual about the self and about others (Broome, 2014). In societies where discourses of power prevail, the power of representing or interpreting reality itself has become linked to spectacle (Hindess, 1995). The “media construction of reality” (Couldry & Hepp, 2016) reduces an abstract person with the help of shiny advertisements to just a consumer, while the same abstract person is reduced by religious forms, constructed by media, to a one-dimensional believer, an adherent of just one faith and group of beliefs. The economy of knowledge, which society reduces to economy and the market, competes for primacy with the mandatory imposition of religious dogma in public and educational spheres (Guile & Livingstone, 2012), and even in the spheres of the deeper understanding of the meaning of the culture of peace or the politics of reconciliation (Basic, 2015b; Korostelina, 2012).

In the 21st century, institutionalised religions³ with a robust infrastructure and logistics in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia and Serbia wish to replace philosophy and sociology of religion. They aim to become a replacement for the critical consideration of the complexity of human, social, economic, political, security, and any other identity. Suddenly awoken religions wish to completely replace (or delete from public consciousness) every other form of spirituality, all philosophically understood autonomous moral and philosophical ethics. It seems that religions, with the help of their symbolic and real institutional power, wish to become an absolute replacement for the philosophical understanding of the world, a replacement for sociology and anthropology (Hjelm, 2014; Lempert, 2015). In short, religions do not wish to be an *irreproachable authority* just for the *transcendental* and *sacred* but for all that transcends, by a philosophical definition, the “boundaries of the mind” and cognisance. They wish to make their exclusive responsibility all that is secular, social, and mundane – all that is valuable such as the value of knowledge itself or of beliefs (Duffield, 2001; Ingelhart & Norris, 2007, p. 33). Religions want to become a *privileged area of competence* responsible for all domains of *knowledge* and *beliefs*, the unavoidable cognitive authorities for each immanently explained rational criticism of the way this earthly world functions and is structured. Religions work by openly telling us that we should be a patient and contented subject and that to submit to higher transcendent truths (not of this world), we should accept all the frauds, profiteers, and thieves who have, with the help of surveillance networks and resource management, almost completely privatised this world by behaving arrogantly and acting as if the whole world and humanity are their private property (Duffield, 2001; Ingelhart & Norris, 2007, p. 33).

If the precept “knowledge is power” once was valid, in the 21st century, we start to understand that power already follows after defining educational institutions that are responsible for forming notions about the world we live in. The field of education, as the field of *education for peace*, is not void of misunderstandings that occur when describing the meaning and purpose of *transitional peace*, in which can and often do arise various forms of *transitional violence*. Transitional violence is the continuation of war violence and, according to certain suppositions, most often linked to the grey economy, organised crime, and corruption (Duffield, 2001; Nordstrom, 2000, 2004, 2007; Stojiljković, 2011, pp. 268–343).

Ideological or *discursive* roots of violence have still not been recognised as a challenging area for the scientific studies of war and post-war violence linked to the *identity politics* and *politics of fear of the other* (Pütz et al., 2004; Marinković & Ristić, 2013, p. 11). The new economy of knowledge has nominally reoriented itself to the “knowledge management” field where *knowledge* is seen *as merchandise*, which is treated as the main producing force of the development of society, where knowledge management manages knowledge and the process of forming notions about knowledge itself. Thus, the science of economy, after the global financial crisis of 2008 and after losing a part of its symbolic and explanatory power, risks converting into an ideology, while neoliberal legal sciences are also facing an increasingly obvious paradox. The paradox lies in the fact that legal sciences aim to adapt to the globalisation of the language of human and other rights, so that “law” becomes *all that which is called the law*, losing touch with the ideal of transitional justice. In such a constellation, the ideological space of manipulating words and things is expanding, so the democratic processes of post-conflict societies and human rights become victims of ideological discourses, in their essence, on democracy and human rights.

³ When discussing religion in this study we are describing religion as the transitional ex-war societies phenomenon. The role of religion in secular societies is different than in war-zones, ex-war zones and pre-war zones.

It seems that even law, at the end of the second decade of the 21st century, might risk transforming into an ideology (Beck, 2013; Pütz et al., 2004). It is becoming clear and obvious that we, as human beings, are living in a deeply unjust world full of various forms of visible (direct, explicit) and less visible (hidden, implicit) *violence* which, from a legal viewpoint, are becoming more and more difficult to sanction. In contrast to formal proclamations that talk about the “right to life”, “right to the freedom of movement”, the “right to work”, and so on, it is apparent that the gulf between the “legal rhetoric” and the “condition of human rights in the field” is growing, and that the gulf between the poor and the rich is drastically widening as well.

Neo-fascism, Religion, and Genocide

Močnik (1998/1999) claims that the end of the Second World War was just a military victory. However, only fascist states and their armies were beaten. Fascism as a historical practice, political method, ideological network, and pattern of thought was not crushed. Fascism has survived and is now returning, even where it was beaten. It shows that what we stenographically name “fascism” is a structural moment in the installation and even reproduction of the local “semi-peripheral capitalism” (Bauman, 1991). Neo-fascism has global, regional, and local dimensions, and various interpretations exist for the term. For example, neo-fascism in the form of the “Chetnik movement” in Serbia (and in the Bosnian entity of Republika Srpska, the Serb Republic) at the end of the 20th and in the second decade of the 21st centuries is an unconcealed murdering variation of neo-fascism and the neo-fascist ideology.

An institutionally organised “Chetnik movement” has continued into the 21st century, persisting after the socialist Yugoslavia, with the blessing and support of the Serbian Orthodox Church and a part of Serbian politics, and even after the latest genocide of Bosniaks. Masked under the Great Serbian ideology, the “Chetnik movement” is a current modern phenomenon and can be linked to neo-fascism (Case No.: IT-09-92; Case No.: IT-95-5/18; Case No.: IT-95-8; Case No.: IT-97-24; Case No.: IT-98-30/1; Case No.: IT-98-33; Case No.: IT-99-36). The ideologists of Great Serbia, even after the verdict of the Hague Tribunal, which found based on forensically proven facts that a genocide occurred in Srebrenica in 1995 (Case No.: IT-98-33), repudiate these facts and deny that Serbian forces committed genocide over Bosniaks (Bećirević, 2010; Mahmutćehajić, 2018). Taking all this into account, the “Chetnik movement” as a form of neo-fascist ideology and an extremely destructive practice can be analysed as a global sociological phenomenon. Besides the socio-political and socio-pathological dimensions, the “Chetnik movement” has strong ideological roots in the Serbian orthodox mythology and can be studied both in its synchronic and diachronic dimensions.

The Great Serbian ideology symbolically survives with the help of the political instrumentalisation of the myth about the Battle of Kosovo from 1389 as a destructive “Chetnik” policy and practice that does not want to see the borders of the Republic of Serbia end at the Drina River but considers Bosnia and Herzegovina to be Serbian land that belongs to Serbians, not Bosnians and Herzegovinians. This dangerous ideology feeds on the assumption of a constant danger of the “Ustasha movement” in Croatia and of Muslim radicalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, justifying its existence. The ideology of the “Chetnik movement”, similar to the ideology of the “Ustasha movement” – within the context of the post-socialist normalisation of anti-fascism – is a variant of modern neo-fascism (Costa-Pinto & Kallis, 2014). Neo-fascism, however, as a modern and not sufficiently studied phenomenon, surpasses the framework of a unilaterally understood Great Serbian or Great

Croatian ideology, and it is evident that the Balkan peninsula is a “fertile ground” for other forms of neo-fascist ideologies as well, whether Albanian, Muslim, or other. After 1995, as well as earlier, the Great Serbian and Great Croatian ideologies survived and fed on the mythological matrix of repudiating cosmopolitanism and a plural or project identity focused on the future (Ravlić, 2013). Myths, stereotypes, and prejudices are fixated on past wars and threaten to destroy any scientific and other advancement towards more humane social relations. With this backdrop, serious falsification of the past and violence towards social reality transpires.

Great Serbian ideologies especially aim to falsify historical facts related to genocide, mass crimes, and serious violations of human rights. Exponents of this ideology deny the responsibility of the state of Serbia and its institutions for spreading the language of hatred and deny the genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The foundation of the real war against Bosnia and Herzegovina and of planning the genocide against the Bosniaks was first and foremost a symbolical violence and strong media propaganda of the Great Serbian ideology. This ideology represented the programme of unifying “all Serbians into a single state”. It promoted the destructive and anti-civilisational idea that the coexistence of peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not possible. Its advocates do the same today, publicly practicing the language of hatred, directed especially against Bosniak women who have survived the genocide.

The sociology of war actively studies the relation between ideologies formed by intellectuals, clergy, and journalists and what happened in the field, after the mobilisation of the male and a smaller part of the female population, as a serious violation of international law conventions. The programmes of “ethnic cleansing”, “humane resettlement of population”, and “joint criminal enterprise” during the wars in the 1990s are well documented in the large databases of regional and international courts of justice (Case No.: IT-09-92; Case No.: IT-95-5/18; Case No.: IT-95-8; Case No.: IT-97-24; Case No.: IT-98-30/1; Case No.: IT-98-33; Case No.: IT-99-36).

Neo-fascism, Discourse, and False Knowledge

Identity knowledge, which we cultivate about ourselves and others as homogeneous or non-homogeneous groups, concerns all social sciences but also relates to ideology as false knowledge (Kalanj, 2010; Pütz et al., 2004; Ravlić, 2013; Schwarzmantel, 2009). Identities of people before the war cannot be the same as the identities of people after the war. Collective policies of collective representations (that is, presentations of citizens) also cannot be the same before and after, revealing huge organised robberies by individuals who have for decades been structurally and systematically connected with the policies of constructing or deconstructing certain collective identities. Social constructivism, as an important orientation in social sciences, teaches us that what we generally call collective identities are, in fact, *historically created social constructions* and not natural categories or natural phenomena from the world of nature (Berger & Luckmann, 1966).

Differentiating “true” from “false” knowledge is an old problem that was never adequately resolved in traditional philosophy and social sciences focused on essentialism. Ideology, as a conceptual term, has almost become a forgotten problem (field) in social sciences, closely related to the existential need for differentiating “true” and “fair” from what is “unfair” and “untrue”. The problem of ideology has again become relevant in the 1990s, especially with the rise of *neo-fascist movements* that believe that a sign of equality could be put between terms such as “ethnicity”, “nation”, “culture”, “religion”, and “civilisation” (Costa-Pinto & Kallis, 2014; Vudli, 2015, p. 101).

During the past few decades, the understanding of the relationship between ideology and organised violence has become more complicated. It became evident that “market fundamentalism”, as the worldview of today’s neoliberal world in which the “power of politics” and the “power of financial speculations” are intertwined, is related to other dogmas, such as the dogma of “religious fundamentalism”, so the understanding of what we collectively call *neo-fascism* has become a matter of dispute and discussion.

Neo-fascist movements of the 1990s had fully complemented the rise of new forms of media and the symbolic (discursive) and real violence. It is interesting that even in 2019, twenty-four years after the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina ended, many regional media outlets mistakenly designate the peoples inhabiting this region as “corpora”. This phenomenon speaks not only of regional journalists, who in the name of transitional reporting on a people or peoples have gained the opportunity to permanently confuse the public with their erroneous naming rhetoric, but also of a deeper social or *transitional pathology* of naming collective identities. However, similar problems of not understanding the media, i.e., the symbolic-discursive foundations of violence, have remained marginalised and suppressed from public discussions and, subsequently, from most scientific discourses.

Dumbing down of the public by the media often remains insufficiently perceived. It is probably mostly unnoticed because of the global popularity of the internet and new media of communication, which enable and reproduce superficiality. The increase in not understanding the meaning and use of identity notions also occurs and spreads because of the dominance of the *narrative* from the domain of the new economy of knowledge and the ideology of human rights, which leads to the loss of self-presentation of the identity of individuals and communities damaged by war and post-war violence. Studying ideology is related to studying how *language* is used in society (Marinković & Ristić, 2013, p. 26; Pütz et al., 2004).

If we were to analyse the content of the syllabi of social science subjects at universities in the countries of the former Yugoslavia, we would see that the problems of ideology – and thus the ideologies of neo-fascism – are practically given no attention. This situation exists because schools of law, economy, and criminology usually pay no attention at all to the problem of the relationship between *ideology* and *discourse* (Pütz et al., 2004). Ideology, and thus the ideology of fascism, is studied only within the framework of the studies of philosophy, sociology, and anthropology. Nevertheless, both in the sociology of knowledge and the sociology of ideology, misunderstandings in the comprehension of the relationship between ideology and violence transpire. When considering ideology, one should emphasise that ideology is a “quintessentially contentious notion” (Beri, 2012, p. 14). However, one should also keep in mind that in the 21st century, even seemingly neutral notions, such as the “economy of knowledge” and the politics of constructing or “representing” a “collective identity”, have become imbued with ideological discourse. Scientific analyses demonstrate that deferring to a dominant ideology or adopting its “practice” occurs owing to a sequence of “appropriate methods”: punishment, exclusion, selection, and similar, to discipline individuals.

Bourdieu (1990, 1992) associated the production of a (dominant) ideology with symbolic forms of capital, and with *public discourse* and discourse in general, because the use of language, the “material of discourse”, always depends on the social position of the speaker, of the possibility of accessing the instituting language, the formal, orthodox, and legitimate speech. The power of the word, according to Bourdieu, can be seen in the fact that the one who is only their “carrier” does not utter them in one’s own name, and that discourse must always be uttered by the one who is authorised to do so.

The symbolic effectiveness of discourse is realised only when the one who is subjected to it acknowledges the one who delivers it – confirming with this acknowledgement the very basis of the discourse (Pütz et al., 2004). Behind the symbolic effectiveness of any instructing ritual always stands social power – which acts on reality by acting on conceptions which relate to it. This area of constant discursive replacement of reality with *conceptions* of what we call reality represents an eternal riddle of the complicated power play between scientific explanations of social reality and ideological deviations that lead to violence towards humans and communities (Costa-Pinto & Kallis, 2014; Pütz et al., 2004). For social sciences that deal with transitional violence and the rights of victims and other citizens to *truth, justice, and reconciliation*, a serious social epistemological problem arises when we, as researchers, realise that the war forms of collective *identity violence* towards others can be at the same time intertwined with the post-war economic and political violence towards “our own group”; this is certainly the case if certain political or interest groups such as political parties or movements inflict such violence in the name of an ideology that calls for the “protection” of higher “vital interests” of the collective.

Neo-fascism, Post-democracy, and Economic Violence

According to some authors, almost 30 years after the proclaimed triumph of *liberal democracy*, we are faced with post-democracy, with clear indications of the end of the golden age of democracy (Crouch, 2004; Milardović & Jožanc, 2013). Post-democracy can be best understood as the *loss of the power of citizens*. Crouch (2007, pp. 83–106) perceives *post-democracy* as the “commercialisation of public services”. He claims that in a post-democracy, “politicians must sell even though they are part of the public sector”. Thus, we enter an interesting field that we could perhaps designate as the privatisation of the public space, and possibly even a significant privatisation of post-Yugoslav republics that have started functioning as *transitional states* after the breakdown of socialism. While the model of the citizen in the entire world of advanced capitalism is developed simultaneously with a strong market economy, the blending of the political and party, business and corporate, and privatisation oligarchies, which have subordinated the whole society to their own interests, occurred in former Yugoslav republics. Instead of economy and politics functioning in the interest of the public good of individuals and communities, each of these newly created societies has become the victim of a wrong transition economy and wrong identity politics.

Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina – to list here the three neighbouring states that have engaged in war – after ending the war found themselves in decades of political, legal, and other successive scandals connected internally by the grey economy. The character of the economic transition of the former socialist republic needs to be analysed in detail. The economic aspects of the transition, the *economic violence* inflicted on citizens as the main form of violence after the 1990s – should be taken into account every time we analyse social aspects and consequences of the incorrectly managed and erroneously applied identity politics in the Balkans. Continued mixing of the politics of all post-socialist governments into the allegedly depoliticised and free area of functioning of *market economy* is an integral part of an insufficiently explored *structural violence of transition*.

This *structural violence of transition* is founded on the strategic unions and alliances among ethnic-cleric-nationalist, neo-populist, and new economic configurations of power and rule, on the very specific transitional “economy of knowledge and skills” (as the hybrid blend of the elements of a “socialist” negotiated economy and a “post-socialist” ethnic-capitalist economy of “knowledge” and the skills of “shady business”). However, this transitional structural violence principally takes place in the overlapping zones of the grey economy and

transitional crime (Duffield, 2001; Nordstrom, 2000, 2004, 2007). In today's social analyses in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is considerably neglected, probably because it was, as a *privileged field* of causing, evolving, and ending violence, reserved for the violence of collective identity among the great nations in the Balkans: large and opposing religions that were considered to be functioning as integral parts of what is called the "clash of civilisations" (Huntington, 2002).

The discourses on post-democracy and neo-fascism are incompatible only at first glance. The condition of *post-democracies*, evidently present at all government levels in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina during the past few years, is a logical consequence of the defeat of the too-soon-proclaimed victory of pluralism and democracy in the 1990s. Today, 29 years after this period, the *idea of post-democracy* can help us describe the situations where legal, political, and corporate scandals introduce *creative dynamism and democratic unrest into the public space of former Yugoslavia*, creating holes in the massive and homogeneous identity discourses. These holes opened the way to the power of reigning (seemingly feuding) ethnic-cleric-nationalist identity politics – developed on the basis of a strategic neglect of post-war economic inequalities and the neo-fascist identitarian spreading of the fear of others.

Culture of Peace, Neo-fascism, Knowledge Transformation, and Economy

This article analyses the *culture of peace* as a possible intellectual response to the rise of neo-fascist ideology, even though we are aware that discourses on the culture of peace can be inverted into their opposite, transforming into new ideological forms and a clouding of reality.

Nationalism occurs today as a caricature form of "secularised religion", while religion itself is often inverted into its opposite and thus vulgarised, so that its dark side becomes a fuel for a new form of populism and violence against the other. It is evident that religion has at least two sides, a positive and a negative, and that it cannot in its diversity be seen as innocent in the generation or explanations of *identity conflicts*. However, religions also change, as do their links to identity politics. In this article, we support the position that the culture of peace is not an isolated social phenomenon presented as a free form of human reflection and behaviour but interactively interweaved with demographic, economic, technological, and ecological dimensions (Puljar D'Alessio & Fanuko, 2013, p. 98). In that sense, we believe the *culture of a sensible and balanced communication* about the meaning and significance of notions and terms we use in discourses about ourselves and others, especially culture as a *creatively understood culture of peace*, together with new critical sciences, could in the 21st century have a significant symbolic role when building true peace, determining a real emancipatory potential for the full development and prosperity of many individuals and communities.

Individuals and communities are assailed by new fears and uncertainties (Taguieff, 2017, pp. 7–12). One of the rhetorical mantras of globalisation, which economists and politicians like to repeat, is that we live in a global society of knowledge. The insistence on viewing "knowledge" as merchandise is deeply flawed. The masking of more profound differences between "knowledge" and "merchandise" is a serious problem of the global world. This very position, which became popular at post-war Balkan universities as well, contains elements of violence, principally elements of violence towards humans and the human knowledge of *what knowledge really is and what it can become in the future*.

Fear can grow from both knowledge and ignorance. It is not always apparent whether knowledge can become more dangerous than ignorance or whether ignorance, as a dogma, if it attains power, is more dangerous than anything we could ever know. The “culture of peace” offers certain answers to many of the dilemmas of our social, economic, and ecological development. The “culture of peace” should not transform into a new religious dogma about our planet Earth and desired life. “Earthly” and “heavenly maps” have long been conflated, and humanity apparently is still incapable of finding an adequate answer for halting the spread of what we call the “politics of fear of the other”, of strangers (Simmel, 1964/1950, pp. 402–408). Perhaps that is the very reason why economists do not like talking about *problems* but proclaim all problems to be challenges, converting even wars into opportunities and new prospects for quick enrichment. The world economy continues, however, to dictate and prescribe scientific rules and methods of using common sense by expanding the domain of their influence far beyond the field of economy. These supra-economic fields encompass the very *structure of knowledge* about what really *exists* (exists as real) as well as what can be defined as a *possible* or *desired knowledge* for a world that is, economists claim, full of opportunities for profit (these opportunities just need to be recognised and taken advantage of as fast as possible for what we did to pay off, no matter what).

For the new economy of knowledge, a person is just a consumer, and for religions just a *believer* or an *unbeliever* who *deserves* or *deserves not* to live; thus, certain “measures” must be finally taken to once and for all “cleanse” the world of those who pollute the supposed “cleanliness” of the majority (Guile & Livingstone, 2012; Hjelm, 2014; Lempert, 2015). Because the world is more complex than ever and probably even more dangerous, especially for those who think for themselves, it would not be a comfort for social sciences if we were to claim that neither the new economy of knowledge nor the “newly awoken religions” bring peace. It seems that the victims of the economic and religious fundamentalism are so numerous that no one alive would be able to count or differentiate them without naming those about whom we constantly hear on our televisions or computer screens. It is becoming evident again that we live in an unjust and violent world. In a world where explicit and implicit violence are so intertwined that we often cannot differentiate them even if we try to more profoundly reflect on how it is at all possible to live in a world where great *economic inequalities* exist and where many children *after being chased out of their homes suffer and die of hunger*. Today we can watch it happen directly on our screens, despite longer and longer advertisements that symbolise the misery and spiritual poverty of the “brave new world” we calmly call a *global society of knowledge and skills* (Broome, 2014).

The new economy of knowledge, which is overly reliant on marketing the *biopolitics of producing obligatory satisfaction* and avoiding any scenes that could make us nauseated, remains completely blind to the suffering of the victims of new identity wars (Guile & Livingstone, 2012; Hjelm, 2014; Lempert, 2015; Weber et al., 2011). While knowledge becomes merchandise, people become slaves of their own ignorance, infantilism, or greed or even slaves of a tragic existentialist situation from which they see no escape if they are unemployed and hopeless. Even the very attempt of the *economic discourse* to just flood and colonise the whole *social field* – entails a certain type of violence. This specific form of violence is already a part of the economic vocabulary that converts time into money, space into markets, opinion into calculation, and humans into resources. The new economy of knowledge and its vocabulary are here just as an example of the functioning of one form of epistemological fundamentalism.

If we, for example, speak of “human resources”, it is evident we are using the economic terminology. If, however, we speak by saying that a certain person is “coming”, let’s say, from the “ranks of the Serbian populace” or from the “ranks of the Croatian populace” or from the “ranks of the Bosniak populace” or from the “ranks of others” – for most people from the Bosnian-Herzegovinian political environment who watch the news and read the local press and political websites, it immediately becomes evident that we are using a circulating identity vocabulary. This vocabulary is also violent because it in advance sorts people into moulds prepared by the ethnic and clerical politics of representing citizens. The use of such terminology reflects the privileged strategy of politically classifying people into certain groups. This strategy is just a mechanism used for collective political identification or collective political sorting of people. However, it is not the only possible mechanism by which human beings can be differentiated. A dangerous problem for individuals and communities arises when one such political mechanism is imposed as an absolute, unalterable, eternal, and permanent one that prevents all other identity politics or politics of difference.

Culture of Peace, Economy, and War

The symbolic activity of labelling, sorting, and using terminology to designate individuals and communities is the result of *imagination* and not a natural state of things. The discursive fields of economy, politics, or culture *do not exist* as *natural facts*; what we call economy, politics, or culture is the result of convention, agreement, and discussion (Guile & Livingstone, 2012; Hindess, 1995; Korostelina, 2012). Within the Bosnian-Herzegovinian semiological environment, it is often considered that ethnicity, nation, religion, and culture are the same. Only tradition and customs of a people are considered *culture*, and that tradition, and accordingly understood customs, often glorify war. The entire field of culture aims to be reduced to folk culture. Thus arise various mythologies about national heroes while completely ignoring the horror and consequences of war. The *culture of peace* in the Balkans is an abstract phrase because the politics of the representation of citizens are still dominated by obscure characters from the 1990s when they used to sing how for each one of “ours”, one should kill a hundred of the “others”.

If we try to reduce the whole world to a single dimension, such as economy, we are talking about economic fundamentalism. However, there are, of course, many other fundamentalisms. The other form of *symbolic* or *discursive fundamentalism* directly related to real *violence* can be recognised in various forms of national, ethnic, or religious fundamentalisms (Costa-Pinto & Kallis, 2014; Hjelm, 2014; Hindess, 1995; Lempert, 2015). Sometimes these ethnic, national, or religious fundamentalisms are so intertwined that it is difficult to differentiate and separate them. The *question of identity* of certain social, national, ethnic, or religious groups was especially influential in the bloody wars of the Balkans in the 1990s. The media and political *constructions of collective identities* have not moved on from the discourse of the “Chetnik” and “Ustasha” movements, and it appears that the mutually separating and connecting Balkan politics of identity have a large identity problem with *essentialism* that they do not know how to solve because they are still part of a never-ending cycle of not understanding symbolical and real sources of identity violence. With *essentialism*, we are designating all positions that believe that human beings can be separated and differentiated according to a single criterion.

Discussions that analyse these questions take place in the register of various politics or *remembrance cultures*. The expression “the culture of remembrance” represents a disputable syntagm based on the imprecise amalgamation of individual and collective

memory. The philosophy of history rightly asks the question of whether collective memory is even possible. Only living individuals can have memories of the past. The problem arises when one aims to collectivise and instil what we call memory into a historically long period of political self-determination in accordance with the character of successive Balkan wars.

Wars have long been normalised (Gavriely-Nuri, 2015; Koloma Beck, 2013). Recently, the secret link between war and business has been revealed. Peace studies dream of peace, trying to clearly distinguish the state of war from the state of peace, but in the 21st century, which had started under the auspices of new wars and the so-called “war on terrorism”, making this distinction is getting harder. Wars have become twisted, bestial, inhuman, and inconceivable outside the world of spectacle. This distortion is attributable not only because their blending with the politics of spectacle through media or the use of drones and increasingly lethal unmanned aerial vehicles changes the very structure and method of waging wars, but principally because the profounder interconnectedness and relationship among economy, politics, and war violence is not perceived.

Culture of Peace and the Critical Self-reflection of Science

If it is true that we live in a global society and – furthermore – if we aim for a global society of knowledge, then the total social development should be based on critical self-reflection of science (Broome, 2014; Guile & Livingstone, 2012). Communication and mutual understanding – as a socially justified use of knowledge and communication that arises between a large number of scientists of different orientations and other agents – is the condition for understanding general welfare and security. Thus, modern science is not even close to the assured assertions from the domain of the mechanistic worldview that was thought to have a rational answer to all questions pertaining to human existence. Modern science does not promise absolute security and absolute control of events and depends on the event (contingency), ambiguity, and relativity. However, the fact that there is no permanent security in the social life of a person does not mean that scientists should in all areas elevate the *principle of uncertainty* to the level of a general regulative principle of science.

The prosperity of a civilisation or a culture cannot be perceived only through new technological achievements of science (Broome, 2014; Guile & Livingstone, 2012; Weber et al., 2011). They have not brought peace or well-being or security just by themselves. With the help of the new economy of knowledge and its imperative that all value must be converted into a cost, the biopolitics of mandatory satisfaction became the regulative principle of the life of a modern man. Because human life cannot be made only of self-pleasing satisfaction – which is infantile just to consider – the biopolitics of mandatory satisfaction should be corrected with discourses that speak of the responsibility of humans for the life of other humans. The scientific view cannot be limited only to methodological individualism, to the egoistically defined goals of the constant production of satisfaction. Social sciences that truly wish to become socially responsible should promote courage and responsibility for the meaning of the diversity of life as a universal value to be recognised through the moral of collective wisdom (Calhoun & Wieviorka, 2017; Delić, 2010).

There is no well-being and security without securing public good, the values that are of general significance for the whole society. The realisation of general good is not possible without encouraging critical thought, without the intelligent *democratisation of society* and without adapting the institutions to the true human needs. The well-being of society and the security of the state can best be encouraged by combining knowledge and responsibility, investing in science and education, encouraging genuine values, and developing citizen and political freedoms and virtues (Crouch, 2004, 2007; Delić, 2010, 2017).

The essence of well-being can be understood as the reflexive and moral transformation of the lives of people and not exclusively as a hypercommercial encouragement of new needs. Hypercommercialism indicates aversion to political actions, citizen values, and activities against the market, while consumption, class inequality, and the so-called “individualism” are considered natural and benevolent. Excessive egoism, greed, covetousness, and lack of empathy for those who suffer (emotional illiteracy) can, however, be considered a socially constructed but not a natural form of human behaviour (Delić 2010, 2017).

Culture can be concisely defined as a way of life of individuals and peoples (Korostelina, 2012; Weber et al., 2011). However, such a definition is not enough to explain the diversity of the meaning of the notion culture. Sociologists of culture, ethnologists, ethnographers, and others who have in specific environments studied the meaning of culture have suggested various definitions of culture. In theoretics we say, for example, that culture is characterised by a high level of distinctiveness, self-awareness, and the relationship towards the other and the different. Uniformity and culture are mutually exclusive. Culture can be evaluated by how we solve the challenges we face as human beings. It can be recognised in works that express our actions. Culture, however, is gaining a new and global meaning (Broome, 2014; Guile & Livingstone, 2012; Korostelina, 2012; Weber et al., 2011).

The influence of technical sciences on various cultures and languages and the attitude of various cultures towards science is the subject of numerous debates. Social sciences are expected to help with recontextualising and redescribing many intercultural problems of modern societies, especially those caught in the integrative processes of globalisation and those that are in any way *excluded* from these processes. Globalisation (cultural, economic, political) demonstrates that modern societies are plagued by cultural non-comprehension of mutual similarities and differences but also great economic inequalities. Outside a social and cultural context, science and education are therefore simply not possible.

Humanity builds its future with various mechanisms of two simultaneous processes: *integration* and *disintegration*. Thus, in the modern world, processes of cultural entropy take place, while on the other hand, numerous and diverse cultures are under threat of disintegrating. However, processes of a scientifically mediated homogenisation of culture are also simultaneously occurring. Science, primarily with the help of technology, shapes and effectuates culture, while the diversity of cultures resists the monoculture of scientific imperialism. Discussions about the *meaning of culture* – which concern also multicultural studies of science – show that science cannot remain isolated from various cultural influences (Couldry & Hepp, 2016; Delić, 2010, 2017; Guile & Livingstone, 2012; Korostelina, 2012; Weber et al., 2011).

Science is a human product, has a social foundation, and can be applied only within a certain culturally shaped social context. Most scientists agree that the state must be included in securing a high-quality basic education, legal frameworks, infrastructure, and certain elements of a social “safety net”. Science and education should focus on improving the *culture of peace* and should contribute to teaching expert knowledge and skills as well. Understanding the multiple influences that exist among science, education, and culture makes us face many social and epistemological, institutional, and structural dilemmas. However, science, as it aims to establish a global society of knowledge, should above all be called upon, as a partner in a dialogue together with other social institutions and social movements, to expand horizons and thus create new possibilities for the social and cultural development of mankind.

Culture of Peace and Critical Pedagogy

The Brazilian pedagogue Paulo Freire believed that faith in the possible humanisation of the world assumes the possibility of a contextual but historically conditioned dialogic learning and the exchange of education and political ideas with “others”. The essence of dialogue is openness and readiness for dialogue, while faith in people should exist even before dialogue as a live process of exchanging words during the communication of an interactive designation of reality, realised as a process of creative emancipation of all the oppressed. People can be classified in various ways: based on their class, ethnicity, sex, or otherwise. To name a social reality, that is, to use the right term to describe it, already means to Freire to “transform the world”. In that sense, the dialogue of those who collectively name the world should not be an act of arrogance (Darder, 2012; Fischman & McLaren, 2005; Freire, 1968, 1992; McLaren, 1996; McLaren & Jaramillo, 2010).

Peace education – which we should strive for by avoiding tautology and lucrative educational policies that recycle vacuous bureaucratic verbalisms – is possible only as a transdisciplinary theoretical and practical activism based on honest dialogue among intellectuals who have become aware that our planet has turned into a battleground where global violence is normalised as opposed to the idea of peace education. Humankind today, more than ever before, needs transreligious and transcontinental solidarity and empathy for those who are in an unbearable amount of pain for being exposed to various forms of oppression for decades (Darder, 2012; Fischman & McLaren, 2005; Freire 1968, 1992; McLaren, 1996; McLaren & Jaramillo, 2010).

One must strive to raise the awareness of people with the help of reflexive and critical studies of a science that insists on honest dialogue among various philosophies of meaning, endeavouring to thus help the disenfranchised to be able. This help should come regardless of the dominant strategies of the postmodern and corporate production of identity as a commercial brand to recognise the different contexts of disenfranchisement that are related to the deeper logics and dialects of the fight between the colonisers (the oppressors) and the oppressed, that is, the enslaved (Darder, 2012; Fischman & McLaren, 2005; Freire 1968, 1992; McLaren, 1996; McLaren & Jaramillo, 2010).

War and deaths of a large number of people, which leads to a genocide of an entire people – such as the genocide of Bosnian Bosniaks in the war against the Bosnian-Herzegovinian multicultural society – convey the need to create peaceful emancipatory identity politics and also the need for a new pedagogy of emancipation of a great number of the oppressed and the disenfranchised that are difficult to explicitly name. Conceptual difficulties, related to certain obvious paradoxes comprised in the politics of the collective representation of citizens after genocide, are linked to these processes.

Freire emphasised that identifying important problems that individuals and communities face in the field should not transform into an empty verbalism that arises from a position of power, but that a true dialogue always implies a certain kind of humility. Dialogue, for Freire, indicates faith in people and a hope that a more humane world is nonetheless possible. The humanisation of human society suggests a community of equal individuals who debate and are capable of thinking for themselves during a dialogue with others, and as part of a universal human community. Herein lies the hope for the culture of peace and the hope for a new politics of forming the identities of those from the other side of the ideological referencing of the inevitability of the “clash of civilisations” or the “clash of cultures”. Individuals, as members of a people, always have the freedom to distance themselves from crimes committed in the name of the entire people to which the individual

(completely accidentally) belongs because they could not choose to be born as a member of this or that people. Such an attitude implies a new social ontology of hope. It assumes the possibility of creating a more just world (Darder, 2012; Fischman & McLaren, 2005; Freire, 1992; McLaren, 1996; McLaren & Jaramillo, 2010). Freire's ideas are also significant within the context of the dialogic fight against the remains of the neo-fascist ideology that we can observe in the many decades of a media and political denial of genocide, constantly employed by almost all of the politicians in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian entity called Republika Srpska, i.e., the Serb Republic (Bećirević, 2010; Mahmutćehajić, 2018).

Freire believes it is not even possible to start a dialogue without hope and that without a dialogue hope as an ontological need loses its foundations and changes into hopelessness (Darder, 2012; Fischman & McLaren, 2005; Freire, 1992; McLaren, 1996; McLaren & Jaramillo, 2010). Only when historical openness towards others exists, when hope and a kind of an anthropological faith in people exist – is true dialogue possible. Freire emphasises that if dialogue participants do not expect to get results from their efforts, their meeting will be sterile, bureaucratic, and strenuous (Darder, 2012; Fischman & McLaren, 2005; Freire, 1968; McLaren, 1996).

Freire thus advocated the dialogic character of education, starting with a method of recognising the true problems of people and communities, for humans always live with others. Living with others is the fundamental determinant of social ontology and the fundamental determinant of a contextually and historically conditioned pedagogy of the oppressed. No nation, people, or social group can survive and grow without contact with others. Even after mass crimes directed against the very idea of humankind – and after genocide – it is necessary to work on pedagogy of notions focused on the politics of reconciliation and of the emancipation of the oppressed and the disenfranchised. Therefore, for the culture of peace and the politics of reconciliation, it is important to develop the education of citizens. It is important to spread and promote the rich theoretical experiences of the critical pedagogy of education. We need a peaceful orientational knowledge, on the basis of which new identity politics can evolve, politics that respect the right to be different and the right to bravely distance ourselves from criminal identity politics.

Ideology of Neo-Fascism, Education, and Culture of Peace

The aim of this article is to critically analyse intellectual conditions for education pertaining to the empirical and normative knowledge dimensions that can oppose the ideologies of neo-fascism. The article is looking for a comprehensive critical perspective with the help of which it would be possible to form a dynamic terminology that could be used for a precise discursive analysis of a political, discursive, and identitarian infantilism and criticism of neo-fascist identity politics. The article explains the social need for a public education of a better quality pertaining to the meaning of political, media, and religious use and misuse of “identitarian concepts” and “identitarian terminology”.

The article critically analyses the strategies of the privileged who apply the referential system and the mechanism of “differentiating” that serves as the epistemic foundation to teach the concepts, terminology, taxonomies, and classifications used to separate people into “ours” and “theirs”. The article calls upon the responsibility of all social players for the future generations in the context of more noticeable media and ideological competitors for the “historical victim status” of the ancient (and recent) actual and ideological wars fought in the past or those that are ongoing, intensifying, or in the process of being resolved in the Balkans.

The basis of the paper is the insight that the human symbolic activity of understanding, labelling, terminologically naming, and (always historically and contextually

driven) interpreting our human past and present is always inseparable from the theoretical practice (and politics) of labelling and characterising war and post-war conflicts. The conclusion is that the normative foundation of education needed in the 21st century should include values such as, for example, truthfulness, humanity, respect for life, non-violence, solidarity, righteousness, tolerance, partnership, mutual respect, and the right to be different.

After the end of war conflicts, where the causes of the violence that occurred during war are thought to be due to the misuse of the symbolic collective identity and the content of what we, quite vaguely, call “ethnicity”, “culture”, “religion”, and the similar – social sciences are faced with the task to explain and understand the *ideological roots* of actual violence that becomes permanent, such as the permanent threat of global war. During the past wars in the Balkans, *organised identitarian violence* occurred most often as a result of an intentionally produced media and political inability to peacefully differentiate between “us” and “others”, that is, the inability to perceive the meaning of “similarities” and “differences” between “us” and “them” by the public.

We believe that by creating institutional and intellectual conditions for the education of empirical and normative dimensions of knowledge, we can fight the ideologies of neo-fascism. This activity is inseparable from the sensitive “game of the construction and deconstruction of identity and differences”, of the construction and deconstruction of the same and the different. A problem arises in social sciences when educational policies and practices mark (1) common pasts, (2) ethnic identity politics, and (3) remembrance policies filled with reigning excess of war violence from the past. The social reality in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina is practically insupportably violent and is already in the process of a symbolic, new media, and identitarian construction of what we, in any kind of essentialist interpretation, designate as a collective identity.

The consequences of the activities of neo-fascist and separatist movements, which again flourish in the second decade of the 21st century, reactualise the literature from the field of multiculturalism that connects the causes and consequences of political and economic violence. Culture, multiculturalism, cultural politics, identity politics, and preserving the national, ethnic, religious, or cultural identity are all circulating terms that are often incorrectly used. It is inadmissible to equate national, ethnic, religious, and cultural identities. Media in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian environment have long since been mixing up the adjectives “srpski” (Serb) and “srbijanski” (Serbian), thus blurring the state border at the Drina. These same media call the people “corpora”, as if the war is still being fought today. The role of social sciences can be useful for a responsible consideration of many processes linked to the misuse of identitarian terms and to privatisation robberies (Stojiljković, 2011). Certain authors have believed earlier that the future of multiculturalism could depend on whether governments will be able to convince their citizens that there are great benefits to be gained from multiculturalism. The failure in implementing the politics of multiculturalism leads even today to distrust between the parts of population that are described as different. The problems of multiculturalism, cultural relativism, the culture of peace, and increasing neo-fascism in the territory of former Yugoslavia should be analysed from a critical perspective and in the specific context of analysing and evaluating the consequences of the criminal politics of “humane resettlement of peoples”. It should also be analysed in the contexts of societal consequences of genocides and new, insufficiently revealed and insufficiently explored circumstances of grave privatisation robberies.

The social sciences cannot as their primary purpose offer concrete political solutions for problems that they are dealing with and analysing. Social sciences offer complex tools and forms of reflection for a different consideration of problems that are incorrectly set or

inadequately explained. The culture of peace should be considered anew as a possible response to the rise of neo-fascist ideologies.

Peace education must be open and dialogic. It has to, in both theory and practice, fight against any kind of dehumanisation of the world. The process of educating a human being, as a process of educating for peace the individuals who belong to different human communities, represents the best possibility of humanising human society because all humans belong to a single large human community. The education for peace and the collective life of peoples should not be tautological, monologic, verbalistic, one-dimensional, reductionist, or orthodox. It always must be dialogic, open, and optimistic – in a higher, anthropological sense of the word, avoiding “naive” or, even worse, “proverbial optimism”. This requirement also means that education worthy of its name should never support any kind of repression, violence, and humiliation of the dignity of an individual. It cannot become oppressive (subjugating, repressive), an instructional education enclosed in a single discursive system that does not allow the voice of those who are different or the voices of all who are (in any way) marginalised, endangered, oppressed, and excluded.

References

- Basic, G. (2018). Definitions of violence: narratives of survivors from the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, 33(13), 2073-2097. doi:10.1177/0886260515622300
- Basic, G. (2017). Concentration camp rituals: narratives of former Bosnian detainees. *Humanity and Society*, 41(1), 73-94. doi:10.1177/0160597615621593
- Basic, G. (2015a). Constructing ‘ideal victim’ stories of Bosnian war survivors. *Social Inclusion*, 3(4), 25-37.
- Basic, G. (2015b). Conditions for reconciliation: narratives of survivors from the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Journal of Criminal Justice and Security*, 17(2), 107-126.
- Basic, G., Delić, Z., & Sofradzija, H. (2017). Obrazovanje za kulturu mira kao viktimološki odgovor na uspon ideologija neofašizma (Education for the culture of peace as victimological response to the rise of ideology of neo-fascism). *The Second International Scientific Victimology Conference "Ambassadors of Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina"*. Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Institute for Development of Victimology, University of Bihać.
- Bauman, Z. (1991). *Modernity and the holocaust*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Bećirević, E. (2010). The issue of genocidal intent and denial of genocide: a case study of Bosnia and Herzegovina. *East European Politics and Societies*, 24(4), 480-502.
- Beck, U. (2013). *Nemačka Evropa* (German Europe). Beograd: Megatrend Univerzitet.
- Berger, L. P., & Luckmann, T. (1966). *The social construction of reality. A treatise in the sociology of knowledge*. New York: Anchor Books.
- Beri, N. (2012). *Uvod u modernu političku teoriju* (Introduction to modern political theory). Beograd: Službeni glasnik.
- Bourdieu, P. (1990). *Homo academicus*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1992). *Language and symbolic power*. New Jersey: Blackwell Publishers.
- Broome, A. (2014). *Issues and actors in the global political economy*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Calhoun, C., & Wieviorka, M. (2017). *Manifest za društvene znanosti s komentarima Edgara Morina i Alaina Tourainea* (Manifesto for social sciences with commentaries by Edgar Morin and Alain Touraine). Zagreb: Timpres.
- Case No.: IT-09-92. Judgment in case of Ratko Mladic. 22 November 2017. Haag: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
- Case No.: IT-95-5/18. Judgment in case of Radovan Karadzic. 24 March 2016. Haag: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
- Case No.: IT-95-8. Judgment in case of Dusko Sikirica, Damir Dosen, and Dragan Kolundzija. 13 November 2001. Haag: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
- Case No.: IT-97-24. Judgment in case of Milomir Stakic. 31 July 2003. Haag: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
- Case No.: IT-98-30/1. Judgment in case of Miroslav Kvočka, Mlado Radic, Zoran Zigic, Milojica Kos, and Dragoljub Prcac. 28 February 2005. Haag: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
- Case No.: IT-98-33. Judgment in case of Radislav Krstic. 19 April 2004. Haag: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
- Case No.: IT-99-36. Judgment in case of Radoslav Brdjanin. 1 September 2004. Haag: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
- Costa-Pinto, A., & Kallis, A. (2014). *Rethinking fascism and dictatorship in Europe*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Couldry, N., & Hepp, A. (2016). *The mediated construction of reality*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Crouch, C. (2007). *Postdemokracija: političke i poslovne elite u 21. stoljeću* (Post-democracy: political and business elites in the 21st century). Zagreb: Izvori.
- Crouch, C. (2004). *Post-democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Darder, A. (2012). Schooling bodies: critical pedagogy and urban youth. *The Victorian Adult Literacy and Basic Education Council (VALBEC)*, 35(2), 3-10.
- Delić, Z. (2017). Introductory chapter: sociology of knowledge and epistemological paradox of globalization. In Z. Delić (Ed.) *Epistemology and transformation of knowledge in global age* (pp. 1-17).
- Delić, Z. (2010). *Sociologija* (Sociology). Tuzla: Off-Set.
- Duffield, M. (2001). *Global governance and the new wars. the merging of development and security*. London: Zedbooks.
- Fischman, E. G., & McLaren, P. (2005). Rethinking critical pedagogy and the Gramscian and Freirean legacies: from organic to committed intellectuals or critical pedagogy, commitment, and praxis. *Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies*, 5(4), 425-447.
- Freire, P. (1992). *Pedagogy of hope. reliving pedagogy of the oppressed*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Freire, P. (1968). *Pedagogy of the oppressed*. London: Penguin Classics.
- Gavriely-Nuri, D. (2015). *The normalization of war in Israeli discourse, 1967-2008*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

- Guile, D., & Livingstone, D. W. (2012). *The knowledge economy and lifelong learning. a critical reader*. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.
- Hindess, B. (1995). *Discourses of power. From Hobbes to Foucault*. New Jersey: Blackwell Publishers.
- Hjelm, T. (2014). Religion, Discourse and power: a contribution towards a critical sociology of religion. *Critical Sociology*, 40(6): 855-872.
- Hromadžić, A. (2017). *Samo Bosne nema* (Only Bosnia is gone). Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek.
- Huntington, S. P. (2002). *Clash of civilizations - and the remaking of world order*. New York: Simon Schuster.
- Ingelhart, R., & Norris, P. (2007). *Sveto i svjetovno: religija i politika u svijetu* (Sacral and secular: religion and politics in the world). Zagreb: Politička kultura.
- Ivić, S. (2014). *Građanstvo evropske unije: ka postmodernoj koncepciji građanstva* (European Union citizenship: towards the post-modern concept of citizenship). Novi Sad: Mediterran.
- Kalanj, R. (2010). *Ideologija, utopija, moć* (Ideology, utopia, power). Zagreb: Naklada Jesenski i Turk.
- Koloma Beck, T. (2013). *The normality of civil war. armed groups and everyday life in Angola*. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.
- Korostelina, K. V. (2012). *Forming a culture of peace. reframing narratives of intergroup relations, equity, and justice*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lempert, M. (2015). Discourse and religion. In D. Tannen, H. E. Hamilton, & D. Schiffrin (Eds.), *The handbook of discourse analysis 2* (pp. 902-920). New York City: John Wiley & Sons.
- Mahmutćehajić, R. (2018). *O antibosanstvu: muke života u tuđim predstavama* (About anti-Bosnianism: the torments of life in the plays of others). Sarajevo: Connectum.
- McLaren, P. (1996). Paulo Freire and the academy: A challenge from the US left. *Cultural Critique*, 33,151-184.
- McLaren, P. & Jaramillo, E. N. (2010). Not neo-Marxist, not post-Marxist, not Marxian, not autonomist Marxism: reflections on a revolutionary (Marxist) critical pedagogy. *Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies*, 10(3), 251-262.
- Milardović, A., & Jožanc, N. (2013). *Demokracija i postdemokracija* (Democracy and post-democracy). Zagreb: Pan liber.
- Marinković, D., & Ristić, D. (2013). *Nacrt za sociologiju ideologije* (Outline for sociology of ideology). Novi Sad: Mediterran Publishing.
- Martinez-Fernandez, C., Kubo, N., Noya, A., & Weyman, T. (2012). *Demographic change and local development: shrinkage, regeneration and social dynamics*. Local Economic and Employment Development, Working Paper Series.
- Močnik, R. (1998/1999). *Koliko fašizma?* (How much fascism?). Zagreb.
- Nordstrom, C. (2007). *Global outlaws. Crime, money and the power in the contemporary world*. London: University of California Press.

- Nordstrom, C. (2004). *Shadows of war. violence, power, and the international profiteering in the twenty-first century*. London: University of California Press.
- Nordstrom, C. (2000). Shadows and sovereigns, *Theory Culture Society*, 17(35), 35-54.
- Puljar D'Alessio, S., & Fanuko, N. (2013). *Kulturalni studiji u lokalnom kontekstu* (Cultural studies in a local context). Zagreb: Hrvatsko sociološko društvo.
- Pütz, M., Neff-van Aertselaer, J., & Van Dijk, T. A. (2004). *Communicating ideologies. multidisciplinary perspectives on language, discourse, and social practice*. Berlin: Peter Lang Publishing Group.
- Ravlić, S. (2013). *Svjetozi ideologije. Uvod u političke ideologije* (Worlds of ideology. introduction to political ideology). Zagreb: Politička kultura.
- Schwarzmantel, J. (2009). *Ideology and politics*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE.
- Simmel, G. (1964/1950). *The sociology of George Simmel*. New York: Glencoe Press.
- Stojiljković, Z. (2011). *Srbija u lavirintu tranzicije: ogledi iz političke sociologije savremenog društva* (Serbia in the labyrinth of transition: reviews from the political sociology of modern society). Beograd: Glasnik.
- Taguieff, P-A. (2017). *Osveta nacionalizma: neopopulisti i ksenofobi u napadu na Europu* (The revenge of nationalism: non-populists and xenophobes attacking Europe). Zagreb: TIMpress.
- Vudli, D. (2015). *Fašizam i politička teorija: kritička perspektiva fašističke ideologije* (Fascism and political theory: critical perspective of fascist ideology). Novi Sad: Politička teorija.
- Weber, B., Herb, K., Marsal, E., Dobashi, T., & Schweitzer, P. (2011). *Cultural politics and identity: the public space of recognition*. Berlin: LIT Verlag.

Authors

Goran Basic is an associate professor in sociology and a senior lecturer at the Department of Pedagogy and Learning, Linnaeus University in Sweden.

Zlatan Delić is an associate professor of economic sociology at the University of Tuzla in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Halima Sofradzija is an associate professor at the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Critical Education

criticaleducation.org

ISSN 1920-4175

Editors

Stephen Petrina, *University of British Columbia*
Sandra Mathison, *University of British Columbia*
E. Wayne Ross, *University of British Columbia*

Associate Editors

Abraham P. DeLeon, *University of Texas at San Antonio*
Adam Renner, 1970-2010

Editorial Collective

Faith A. Wilson, *Aurora University*
Wayne Au, *University of Washington, Bothell*
Jeff Bale, *University of Toronto*
Theodorea Regina Berry, *U of Texas, San Antonio*
Amy Brown, *University of Pennsylvania*
Kristen Buras, *Georgia State University*
Paul R. Carr, *Université du Québec en Outaouais*
Lisa Cary, *Murdoch University*
Anthony J. Castro, *University of Missouri, Columbia*
Alexander Cuenca, *Indiana University*
Noah De Lissovoy, *University of Texas, Austin*
Kent den Heyer, *University of Alberta*
Gustavo Fischman, *Arizona State University*
Stephen C. Fleury, *Le Moyne College*
Derek R. Ford, *Syracuse University*
Four Arrows, *Fielding Graduate University*
Melissa Freeman, *University of Georgia*
David Gabbard, *Boise State University*
Rich Gibson, *San Diego State University*
Rebecca Goldstein, *Montclair State University*
Julie Gorlewski, *SUNY Buffalo*
Panayota Gounari, *UMass, Boston*
Sandy Grande, *Connecticut College*
Todd S. Hawley, *Kent State University*
Matt Hern, *Vancouver, Canada*
Dave Hill, *Anglia Ruskin University*
Nathalia E. Jaramillo, *Kennesaw State University*
Richard Kahn, *Antioch University Los Angeles*

Kathleen Kesson, *Long Island University*
Philip E. Kovacs, *Madison, Alabama*
Ravi Kumar, *South Asia University*
Saville Kushner, *University of Auckland*
Zeus Leonardo, *University of California, Berkeley*
John Lupinacci, *Washington State University*
Darren E. Lund, *University of Calgary*
Curry Stephenson Malott, *West Chester University*
Gregory Martin, *University of Technology, Sydney*
Rebecca Martusewicz, *Eastern Michigan University*
Cris Mayo, *University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign*
Peter Mayo, *University of Malta*
Peter McLaren, *Chapman University*
João Paraskeva, *UMass, Dartmouth*
Jill A. Pinkney Pastrana, *U of Minnesota, Duluth*
Brad J. Porfilio, *Seattle University*
Kenneth J. Saltman, *UMass, Dartmouth*
Doug Selwyn, *SUNY Plattsburgh*
Özlem Sensoy, *Simon Fraser University*
Patrick Shannon, *Penn State University*
John Smyth, *University of Huddersfield*
Mark Stern, *Colgate University*
Beth Sondel, *North Carolina State University*
Hannah Spector, *Penn State University, Harrisburg*
Linda Ware, *SUNY Geneseo*

