“Intrusions into the Human Body”
Quarantining Disease, Restraining Bodies, and Mapping the Affective in State Discourses

Abraham P. DeLeon
University of Texas at San Antonio

Kevin J. Burke
University of Georgia


Abstract
The recent explosion of post-apocalyptic visions of zombie outbreaks, plague, and bio-engineered super viruses reveals the preoccupation that exists about the potential for future disaster and its link to our conceptions of health, the body, and the public good. Born from this same historical conjuncture, The New York State Public Health Manual: A Guide for Attorneys, Judges, and Public Health Professionals, published in 2011, outlines the powers of the state of New York during a time of catastrophe; i.e. plague, outbreak, natural disaster. This particular legal guide demonstrates a current manifestation of biopower and the affective potential States hope to capture and control that emanate from the collision and interaction of bodies. States harness affect through various ways, and in this particular study, through a text that mobilizes fear and the ever-present potential of a threat, ultimately justifying draconian social measures in the name of “public safety”. Written texts provide a rich context in which to critique and better situate State policies within larger frameworks of discipline and control. States and bodies are inextricably connected to each other, and analyzing public policies help better contextualize these links specifically.
“Intrusions into the Human Body” 2

Intrusions Into the Body

The future of threat is forever.

— Brian Massumi, “The Future Birth of the Affective Fact”

The opening quote by Brian Massumi speaks to the apocalyptic vision expressed in many popular culture forms today, or what amounts to the threat of what is yet to come or materialize; what Giorgio Agamben (1998) called “the urgency of catastrophe” (p. 2). Whether in tales from science fiction or through mainstream Hollywood films, the obsession with impending threat abounds (Trimble, 2010). Zombies, reeking of death, inch towards us amid cities in ruin. Nuclear holocausts wipe us out only to leave humanity to fend for themselves in an apocalyptic wasteland. Plague strikes and decimates the population with a few struggling survivors fending for their lives. Bio-engineered super viruses are unleashed from research facilities and infect an unknowing populace. Urban cities appear sinister and foreboding as they rot in decay. It appears that the machines have stopped.1 Despite these fictional visions however, the threat remains in material reality in such examples like surveillance in urban centers or in the intensification of climate change effects or the ongoing slaughter of children in schools in the United States.

These fictional futuristic visions and the material reality in how they are manifested share a similar pessimism related to our collective inability to alter what is supposedly yet to come. The idea of a future outside of catastrophe becomes relegated to the discourse of utopian thinking. It also leaves humanity impotent in the face of impending disaster. The recent explosion of these apocalyptic films, tales of zombie outbreaks, plagues and disease, or general pessimism towards a future apart from Blade Runner or Resident Evil is a powerful indicator of the lack of hope for a different world or a future free from a disastrous end. Producing fear, distrust, and other affective responses, the State implements a variety of mechanisms to (re)produce fear and threat. It is through the idea of the threat that States2 can harness affective potentials of bodies.

Threat is from the future. It is what might come next. Its eventual location and ultimate extent are undefined. Its nature is open-ended. It is not just that it is not: it is not in a way that is never over. We can never be done with it. Even if a clear and present danger materializes in the present, it is still not over. There is always the nagging potential of the next after being even worse, and of a still worse next again after that. (Masumi, 2010, p. 53)

Threats, either imagined, material or a combination of both, elicit a strong response from bodies;

1 We refer to Trotter’s (1990) conceptions of machines when he indicated in “Colonial Subjects” that colonialism operated like one, de-centering the notion of the Western individual towards a systemic understanding of colonization. The machine is also present in the work of Deleuze and Guattari when they refer to the human body as a “machine”. One could put forth the argument that Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1983) is its own little machine: whether through bodies, bodies without organs, or other intensities resonating from their philosophy. Hardt and Negri argued in Empire (2000) that, “Machines produce. The constant functioning of social machines in their various apparatuses and assemblages produces the world along with the subjects and objects that constitute it” (p. 28). The machine serves as a fitting metaphor for the processes that also occur at specific historical conjunctures. See also Abraham P. DeLeon, Machines (2015).

2 We capitalize States explicitly not as a claim of truth, but only to represent the vast array of discourses, experiences, affects, experiences, economic arrangements, and institutions that support this construction.
what is often yet to come is shrouded in fear and mystery because of the impending threat that the present seems to also possess. The threat from the future, marinated in pessimism and bleakness, also points to our seemingly collective inability to think of potential alternatives for humanity. It demonstrates the necrotic state of current utopian thinking.

These horrific visions of humanity’s future speak to a lack of imaginative work that is needed to think/feel/be/move outside hegemonic parameters and frameworks. The images and visions described above are created in a circuit of cultural production that also produces our own subjectivities, while also influencing larger political discourses. For example, the New York State Unified Court System and the New York Bar Association have produced a provocative legal guide. The New York State Public Health Manual: A Guide for Attorneys, Judges, and Public Health Professionals published in 2011 (hereafter N.Y. Manual) outlines the legal responses the State of New York must follow during an outbreak, terrorist attack, or other large-scale catastrophe. It clarifies legal stances, compares past cases, and delineates authority of public health officers who are given the task of making decisions in the field concerning isolation, quarantine, inoculation, or removal. It clarifies authority, grants powers to specific positions, and outlines legally how the State can control and mediate bodies through legal precedent, medical practice, police power, and spatial configurations. The manual is one of the first thorough legal guides on the subject and has the potential to set legal precedent in the United States. Discursively and materially, institutions like the State (and the productions that arise from its institutions) (re)produce bio-power, harnessing from bodies their feelings, emotions, desire; in other words, the State tries to harness the affective potential(s) and residue(s) of bodies, utilizing space to further perfect these practices.

Born from the work of the philosopher Baruch Spinoza, and taken up by theorists such as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Brian Massumi, and French theorists Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, affect is best understood as emotion, relationships, feelings, desire, fear, joy, anticipation, wildness: the interaction of bodies (human, nonhuman) and the affective relations between them. Spinoza (1949) famously quipped that philosophers had not yet fully understood what a body could do. The “not yet” of what Spinoza wrote is what drives affect, “as well as those theories that attempt to negotiate the formative powers of affect” (Gregg & Seigworth, 2010, p. 3). In essence, “affect is found in those intensities that pass body to body...in those resonances that circulate about, between and sometimes stick to bodies and worlds” (p. 1). We can also think of affect as the “forces in-between”, (p. 2) possibly existing in the middle ground of social experiences and the bodies that collide, dance, move, and join together. (DeLeon, 2010).

Although affect has been explored theoretically, there has been little work done analyzing how States try to harness it through its own biopolitical incantations, i.e. public policies aimed at controlling, displacing, inoculating, quarantining, and in extreme cases, exterminating bodies. Part of the point of the work here is to suggest that because affect is not contained only through our bodily experiences, but is also (re)produced discursively through a wide variety of text(s) (Weatherell, 2013), attending to the confluence of official State documents and de facto ‘official’ and mimetic cultural texts, will allow an unique approach to considering the function of hopelessness and pessimism as a public pedagogy. The N.Y Manual serves as a reminder of the State’s investment in bodies and their affective potential, disguised through a discourse of caring that purports to be helpful—if paternalistic—truly concerned for issues of “public health” and
“safety”. Anne Stoler, however, also understands the ability and drive of the State to harness and distribute affective power:

More basically, such consent is made possible, not through some abstract process of internalization, but by shaping appropriate and reasoned affect, by directing affective judgments, by severing some affective bonds and establishing others, by adjudicating what constituted moral sentiments—in short, by educating the proper distribution of sentiments and desires. (2007, p. 9)

In this way, Stoler speaks to not only the colonial systems of rule, but also to the State formations that exist in very similar ways as colonial regimes did. Following the lead of Nigel Thrift will also be useful, as he argued the city is a site of the (re)production of affect, especially because “cities may be seen as roiling maelstroms of affect” where, “anger, fear, happiness, and joy are continually on the boil, rising here, subsiding there…” (2004, p. 57). Thrift clearly demonstrates that affect is something that transcends bodies, while noting the potential of affect to be harnessed towards domination. Through a text that mobilizes fear, a potential threat, public health, and the discourse of “public safety”, the N.Y. Manual attempts to justify draconian social measures during times of crisis.

To support these claims, we must turn to the archive and our current historical conjuncture to analyze not only contemporary biopolitical formations, but also their affective forces and flows produced by a text that emanates from the State; a legal guide created that outlines its specific powers and the powers of the health officials that see it through. Given the extensive work Foucault (2008) has done around the productive power of the State as harnessed through medical, legal and discursive technologies, we engage in a theoretical investigation, or better yet, a shout, a scream that will hopefully produce a small crack (Holloway, 2010) in what appears to be a highly diffused and expansive network that operates through the bodies, emotions, and experiences of subjects who (re)produce these same realities. Whether through mass movements, sit-ins, forms of pedagogy, street protests, or critical scholarship, resistance produces cracks. The scream that grows inside our historically situated insurgent bodies pushes us to challenge the State and its manifestations (Shukaitis, 2009). The N.Y. Manual provides the opportunity to deconstruct a text that emerges directly from the State, while also demonstrating its important link to issues like the creation of a conception called “public health” and “safety” (and, thus, unhealthy bodies by contrast, in need of correction or healing and unsafe societies in its binary forms).

Biopolitics in an Era of Accountability

This bio-power was, without question, an indispensable element in the development of capitalism; the latter would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production.

— Michel Foucault, “Right of Death and Power over Life”

Speaking of accountability, one might think this conversation is rooted in education, the location of much of our academic work. However the domains of public health (from which the N.Y. Manual is an example) and education are born from similar epistemological, legal, medical, and social conditions, concerned with conversations surrounding access, cultural awareness, and community building. Education is at the heart of producing certain students for certain positions
in society and medicine also produces bodies and labels like “sick”, “infected”, or “mad”; as well, we are, of course, educated in what counts as healthy or unhealthy in any number of ways. Education and public health are both implicated in reproducing larger social realities. Thus the “accountability” craze that is sweeping educational thought and research across the contemporary United States is a small component of the larger historical context out of which the N.Y. Manual has arisen.

Much like a State mandated educational exam, the N.Y. Manual is a form of accountability through the creation of legally sanctioned responses during crisis. It provides a framework for State practitioners to answer legal questions or follow procedures in time of stress, trauma, and catastrophe. However, public domains (in which education and health are comprised for example) are linked in a series of discourses that produce notions of morality, economics, and the political created in a cycle that spans these same discursive terrains. Education and public health are also heavily invested in the community, whether through public health regimens and campaigns, sanitation, “child-centered” pedagogy, or any other technology aimed at solidifying control and coercion. Although disciplinary control is a component of these arrangements, it runs much deeper in which at stake, is the “soul” of humanity. Nikolas Rose (1999) claimed that:

The development of institutions and techniques that required the co-ordination of large numbers of persons in an economic manner and sought to eliminate certain habits, propensities, and morals and to inculcate others, thus made visible the difference between those who did or did not, could or could not, would or would not learn the lessons of the institution. These institutions acted as observing and recording machines, machines for the registration of human differences. (p. 136)

The institutions that Rose alludes to are vitally linked to the bodies that comprise them. These societal machines observe, classify, and catalog difference, dispersing the mechanism of control over a wide social space and strata. Thus, social systems and bodies are intertwined, becoming the heart of political control and coercion. As Erin Manning (2007) aptly points out, “states and bodies coexist despite their great antipathy” (p. xxii).

Further, Agamben (1995) argued that, “the species and the individual as a simple living body become what is at stake in a society’s political strategies” (p. 3). This is not to say that political or traditional forms of judicial power are not real or do not produce tangible effects on people’s lives. However, biopower is a much deeper manifestation of production that, “penetrates subjects’ very bodies and forms of life” (p. 5). It is the production of life that Agamben speaks of that makes biopower such a pervasive and provocative way to think about contemporary relationships of power. This seems to match the current State’s (as in the U.S. for example) obsession with regulating the movement of bodies (the current immigration “debate”); the governing of women’s bodies (anti-abortion discourses, etc.); or through disciplining and mediating sexuality (gay marriage). Each proclivity for control and definition clearly points to the State’s obsession with bodies and their potentials. It is the power of emotional response (or the affective potentialities of bodies) that proves to be the most provocative to think about how the State mobilizes biopower through regulation, administration, and control, emerging in the form of a State-sanctioned legal guide.
It is these “hidden” aspects of bodies, their affective potentiality that we just mentioned, that States want to harness the most. Foucault (1980) called this will biopower, or the administration, mediation, capture, and control of all aspects of life. “Their supervision was effected through an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a bio-politics of the population….whose highest function was perhaps no longer to kill, but to invest life through and through” (p. 139). Moving beyond simple disciplinary techniques that punish or coerce the body, biopower is invested in the politics of life and death. This makes biopower productive, because it produces specific forms of power at particular historical moments. Hardt and Negri (2001) also recognized, in a reformulation of the idea of Empire, the vital role that biopolitics plays in the formations of power. “Power is thus expressed as a control that extends throughout the depths of the consciousness and bodies of the population—and at the same time across the entirety of the social relations” (p. 24). Biopower thus “reaches down to the ganglia of the social structure” (p. 24). We are then produced by biopower and in essence, also the producers of the same relationships that create subjects and our subjectivities that can be directed towards particular forms of social control.

Cary Federman, Dave Holmes, and Jean Daniel Jacob (2009) argue that, “biopolitics rejects a strictly legalistic and positivistic understanding of power over subjects; its gaze is directed at the ever-expanding control over subjects or populations that exist beyond legal and scientific frameworks” (p. 38). In a series of extensive lectures, Foucault (1980) vigorously critiqued viewing power as something solely to be wielded against others or to influence events. Instead, Foucault pushed us to examine the role of power in controlling (and producing) life itself, or what Foucault called a “technology of power centered upon life” (p. 144). In his 1978 lecture, Foucault claimed that his concerns were to explore, “the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power” (p. 1). Here Foucault is explicit in demonstrating that the control over life is central to how power is reproduced under certain historical conditions.

Hardt and Negri (2001) also conceptualized Empire through a lens of biopower when they were speaking of networks of capitalist and corporate power that span territories, almost assuming new forms of corporeality for neoliberal capitalism itself:

Biopower is a form of power that regulates social life from its interior, following it, interpreting it, absorbing it, and rearticulating it. Power can achieve an effective command over the entire life of the population only when it becomes an integral, vital function that every individual embraces and reactivates of his or her own accord. (pp. 23-24)

Like Foucault, Hardt and Negri also locate the body as a central point of construction and importance, as this is where technologies are directed, experimented with, and eventually perfected. It is the “embrace” and the “reactivation” that makes biopower a potent force for social control because of its ubiquitous nature and its invisibility by a relatively uninformed populace. But, as Manning (2007) points out, it is the body that is at the center of relationships of power, as States try to claim them through “grids of intelligibility”, capturing them for “service to the national body-politic” through restraint, and stabilization, demonstrating that States attempt to claim and construct a unified whole (p. xv). Through the control of life itself, power is dispersed across the State and bodies, linking the two in cycles of (re)production.
Affective Forces and Flows

Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the strength of those who undergo them.

—Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*

Our mouths open, our fingers dance across keyboards, screams emerge. Although a scream might alert others to danger it has the potential to create alternatives or multiple interpretations; in essence it creates *affective resonances* (perhaps this is a scream of ecstasy, say). Through the forces and flows present in our social experiences, whether that be in bodies, voices, creations, or what Deleuze and Guattari called “intensities” (1987, p. 153) and “sensations”, (1994, p. 166) affect does not remain solely on the plane of emotions or feelings, but can also transcend these, being mobilized through forces of affect that exist in the interaction and play of bodies. Massumi (1992) reminds us that, “force is not to be confused with power. Power is the domestication of force. Force in its wild state arrives from outside to break constraints and open new vistas. Power builds walls” (p. 6). Affect, and its accompanying forces, help shape or influence the mobilization of power and how it is constituted, circulated, and performed”(Harding & Pribram, 2004, p. 873). These affective powers pass from body to body, linked to the forces and flows that are created together and alone through movement, art, texts, or other forms of imaginative production.3

In essence, we are creating new territories for our affective desires to explore. “Write, form a rhizome, increase your territory by deterritorialization, extend the line of flight to the point where it becomes an abstract machine” (Deleuze & Guatarri, 1980, p. 11). This ought be done, in the end because, “only intensities pass and circulate” (p. 153). Artistic production, scientific questions, or philosophical inquiry is not solely about the creation of a finished product that is to be studied and analyzed using a set theoretical paradigm or visual cues. No, these intellectual and creative domains should concern us because of the *intensities and sensations that are created*, the affective resonances produced by the experiences themselves. “We paint, sculpt, compose, and write with sensations. We paint, sculpt, compose, and write sensations” (1991, p. 166). To Deleuze and Guattari, the production of art, philosophy, or other cultural production is filled with intensities and sensations that attempt to, “cast planes over chaos” (p. 202).

For example, art attempts to capture chaos, “a plethora of orders, forms, wills—forces that cannot be distinguished or differentiated from each other” (Grosz, 2008, p. 5). Grosz describes this as a way that chaos can be slowed for a moment, a millisecond capture of pure intensities. Chaos, “the whirling, unpredictable movement of forces, vibratory oscillations that constitute the universe” (p. 21), interacts with our bodies, even if for a moment, “directly touched by the forces of chaos from which it so carefully shields itself in habit” (p. 21). It is because art, philosophy, or musical compositions generate “vibratory waves, rhythms, that traverse the body and make of the body a link with forces it cannot otherwise perceive and act upon (p. 23). This scream is not concerned with art per se, but only to demonstrate that historical creations produce intensities and sensations; affective resonances when interpreted or enacted upon bodies. Lawrence Grossberg (1997) once argued that a key component to popular culture (and one can extend this to any number of other areas of cultural production) is its affective

3 Never mentioned directly by Deleuze or Guattari, the imagination lies at the heart of their flows, forces, and intensities because of the affective potential of bodies.
dimensions, and art is merely one of the domains that can possibly emerge. Although art appears to be one medium that produces affective responses, we can also extend this idea to other cultural productions that are made outside the domains of what is considered “artistic”.

Fictional writing, philosophy, and even “official” texts from States create potential conditions that may also formulate negative intensities, or, those affects that are directed towards domination and a will to power in its most traditional sense. Patricia Clough (2010) has pointed to how affect can also transcend bodies (what she calls “biomedia”) that, “makes possible the mass production of genetic material” and “new media” formations, “where digitization makes possible a profound technical expansion of the senses” (p. 207). Although not focusing on the State, this work demonstrates that affect plays a role in what Clough calls “a harbinger of and a discursive accompaniment to the forging of a new body” (p. 207). The State tries to forge new forms of corporeality and realities in daily struggles of dominance over those deemed troublesome, exotic, dangerous, or Other. It is affect transferred between bodies that bind us together in circuits of cultural production and intensities that help to motivate social relations. Thus, the affective can be energy that is harnessed by institutions, States, or the discursive and affective formation known as Empire (Hardt & Negri, 2001).

The negative intensities created by discourses, texts, or other creations that have emanated for/from the State are intimately tied with the biopolitical regime created by societies that rely on coercive and hierarchical institutions and the affective resonances produced by bodies caught in these systems of domination. When Clough (2010) thus argued new bodies are continuously remade and created under specific historical conditions (what she calls “biomediated” and “historically specific”), this process invests “capital into being” eloquently describing a very similar occurrence when the State tries to harness affect in the social policies and “official” and “unofficial” texts that are produced (p. 207). When the N.Y. Manual is more fully contextualized in the next section, the affective implications will become more readily apparent, especially the affective response when one reads and engages a particular text, but also of the legal, social, political, economic, or moral ramifications of the N.Y. Manual and what it means during times of crisis and disaster. The experience(s) of disaster inhabit the realm of the affective and looking/reading/being near major disasters or catastrophes, one is struck by the affective dimension of the occurrence.

Affect exists on multiple planes of thought, text, and experience. Although often considered solely for its potential (and admittedly a much needed conversation), few scholars have explored the affective domains that emerge from oppressive realities, institutions, or events whose function may be to subdue, discipline, or dominate certain segments of the population producing new forms of life itself. When Deleuze and Guattari speak of the “sensations” created by painting a portrait, creating a sculpture, composing music, or writing a treatise, we can think of the State attempting to create the same types of intensities in what emerges from those that create its doctrines, legal systems, and political formations. Sensations emerge here too Massumi (2002) argues that affect is autonomous, “to the degree to which it escapes confinement in the particular body” precisely because affect is ultimately “unactualized” (p. 35). Actualization can emerge through texts that attempt to mobilize affect. Thus, texts are an extension of the affective forces that helped to create them and looking in the right place can reveal a trove of provocative texts. The following analysis of the N.Y. Manual demonstrates its richness, but also the necessity in understanding/theorizing how the affective potential of bodies is harnessed by hierarchical and coercive institutions through questionable and reactive social policies.
Infected Premises, Places, and Things

Medical space can coincide with social space, or, rather, traverse it and wholly penetrate it.
—Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic

Historically, whether in contemporary State formations or previous colonial systems, hierarchical institutions have produced a trove of texts that provide vivid descriptions of social policies, educational programs, public health initiatives, or economic agendas that are discursively linked to social well being or legitimacy of the law (see Stoller, 2007 and Rowe & Tuck, 2017). The *N.Y. Manual* links a variety of discursive terrains together, including public health, the body, public safety, the rule of law, and the potential of threat. This matches Ben Anderson’s (2010) claims when he described how “objects” of power, “name the surfaces of contact for modalities of power and thus acts as a hinge between a desired outcome and the actions that make up the exercise of power” (p. 163). He rightfully acknowledges that affect and politics are inseparable historical formations. Like discourse and power, discourse and affect are also vitally linked, despite being unexplored in critical discourse analysis. (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). Anderson (2010) theorizes “total war” and the “threat” through the lens of the negative potential of affect and our analysis is also situated in this same intellectual space. Through the threat constructed in this text, the *N.Y. Manual* links the body, public health, and crisis demonstrating that the three are closely intertwined.

Ian Hacking (1991) argued a similar point, in which he saw biopower emerging through the use of statistical measure and its consequences for society, because the development of law and medicine cannot be separated (p. 183). The *N.Y. Manual* and its practices emerge from a spatial politics of quarantine and the role of public health officers as enforcers of State practices, keeping an ever-vigilant eye on public health utilizing legal codes and precedent. Although unspoken, the presence of affect is there as an invisible shadow of these particular manifestations of power, emerging when the text evokes the distribution and regulation of “healthy” and “infected” bodies, to the affective resonances created by the decisions made by public health officers for communities during a time of crisis. These decisions extend down to decisions over life and death or the decision to “slaughter” nonhumans. These types of decisions over life and death, the spatial practices of quarantine, under the gaze of public health officials (re)produce affective forces and resonances.

Quarantining Secretions and Excretions

Public health, through the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries, has proven to be one of the areas in which power is clearly consolidated. Often a contested terrain on multiple levels, public health has clearly been a concern for State disciplinary regimens. Scholars from Foucault to Nikolas Rose have focused on health because of how medicine was enacted on a particular population to produce certain ideas/practices/beliefs/values concerning bodies. Foucault demonstrated deftly that the shifting nature of medicine in France corresponded to larger political, economic, and societal shifts occurring at the same time. And ultimately the discourse was about shifting epistemological foundations of medicine, as more power was granted to doctors in diagnosing and treating disease. Through the ever-present, watchful, and informed gaze of doctors, bodies were scanned for any perceived abnormalities. Signs on the body were interpreted solely by doctors, (in)formed by their gaze and emergent specialized ‘medical’ knowledge (Foucault, 1994).
Medical knowledge, operating through public health officials, exerts a tremendous amount of influence and the *N.Y. Manual* is an excellent example of how public health as a discursive formation is employed to add legitimacy to the State’s response to health crises. One of the most interesting formations in the text is its construction and legitimation of the practice of quarantining. The State’s response to an outbreak is to quarantine populations from each other to contain, spatially, the potential threat of the spread of contagion:

*Quarantine of premises*: ‘prohibition of entrance into or exit from the premises, as designated by the health officer, where a case of communicable disease exists of any person other than medical attendants and such others as may be authorized by the health officer; (2) prohibition, without permission and instruction from the health officer, of the removal from such premises of any article liable to contamination with infective material through contact with the patient or with his secretions or excretions, unless such article has been disinfected’. (p. 7)

In this excerpt, we are immediately struck by the power of the health officer in determining these crucial cases. However, what proves to be a much more provocative observation is the State’s utilization of space (limiting movement), the investment of the State with the body and its fluids (“secretions or excretions”), and the concept of medical purification (contamination and disinfection). Bodies must be purified through restraint and disinfection, removing any signs of a bio-medico threat to existing State structures of power. To reassert this direct form of control, the guide reiterates that, “isolation and quarantine are not limited to just the listed disease; the City Health Code authorizes ‘removal or detention’ for any contagious disease that ‘may pose an imminent and significant threat to the public health’” (p. 8). The ever-present potential threat is a powerful form of social control because it tries to contain bodies at the most intimate level: through our emotional response to the fear of contagion and disaster.

Disease strikes fear at the most intimate levels because of the uncertainty that it entails and the suffering carried with it as well as in its close relationships to power (and powerlessness) (Mantilla, 2011). Ruling orders have always used contagion as an excuse to exert more direct forms of control over the population through quarantining practices and/or inoculation programs enacted upon bodies. Quarantining is a spatial practice and the limiting of movement is a way in which to capture bodies and redistribute the affective potential of perceived crisis towards State control based on the perceived threat of contagion. The centrality of space in organizing and restraining power cannot be underestimated particularly as we seek to link it to an analysis of biopower and the harnessing of the affective potential of bodies.

This link between contagion and quarantine is so intense that in another instant in the *N.Y. Manual* it is legally established that, “it shall be the duty of the attending physician immediately upon discovering a case of highly communicable disease…to cause the patient to be isolated, pending official action by the health officer” (p. 10). In this way, the State not only has a reporting mechanism to strictly control the movement of bodies through public health officers, but also contagion becomes the trigger that officials can exploit to justify draconian social measures through the *spatial* practice of isolation. Interestingly, the *N.Y. Manual* recognizes that:

Involuntary confinement, either by isolation or quarantine, directly affects a fundamental right—the right to liberty—and the requirements of substantive due process compel the locality to demonstrate that it has a ‘substantial government
interest’ in that confinement…the government must show (1) that the specific individual, in fact, poses a danger to society. (p. 13).

Although this aspect of the policy tries to call forth some sort of justice mechanism that supposedly exists in the maze of legal and health codes concerning civil rights and protections, in the end, “the courts have long upheld the use of the police power of public health officers to isolate and quarantine persons infected with or exposed to infectious diseases” (p. 14). If bodies resist, State officials can “order the removal and/or detention of such person or of a group of such persons by issuing a single order…Such person…shall be detained in a medical facility or other appropriate facility or premises designated by the Commissioner’” (p. 19). Through a self-referential governing mechanism, the capturing of movement, the harnessing of affect through the potential of a threat, and the spatial practice of ordering bodies, the State solidifies practices that extend and maintain practices of domination.

In the end the State has the right to salus populi, the “recognition that society has a right that corresponds to the right of self-preservation in the individual, and it rests upon necessity because there can be no effective government without it” (p. 22). Interestingly, the sovereignty of the State and the individual body are intertwined, with the right of the State to exist along with the right of the individual. Bodies are thus imbricated with State structures, creating affective resonances between the bodies that navigate the institutions of the State itself. Manning (2007) argues that, “bodies are never completely enslaved to the state because bodies are never completely reducible to either Nature or the state. Bodies become on a continuum that evolves in relation with pacts formed around institutions of power and compliance” (p. 147). Implicitly, the text points to these resonances as a vital link in how State sovereignty is established legally, politically, and morally. Evoking the discourse of “rights” and its implications in the discursive formation known as human rights ground this further in hegemonic discourses that center the human in a framework that narrowly defines “rights” in the context of State realities (Armaline & Glasburg, 2009).

Proper and Vigilant Medical Inspection

Linked to the practices of quarantine, or what we consider the spatial practices of affect, the role of health officials remains a prominent theme throughout the N.Y. Manual. Public health officers emerge from the text as central characters during a plague or crisis. Often constructed and positioned as the “enforcer” of public health safety, they have a broad range of powers during an emergency, often governing the movement and health of bodies.

They [public health officers] are required to ‘immediately investigate’ any outbreaks of contagious disease…and to make an ‘immediate and thorough’ investigation of ‘a nuisance which may affect health’…The initial implementation of all the provisions of law relating to isolate, quarantine, examination, treatment, and searches and seizures is the responsibility of the local health officer. (pp. 4-5)

It becomes apparent how pervasive the investigative powers of public health officers truly are, but also their judgment in applying quarantine, isolation, and performing the examination. In Foucault’s study on the shifting nature of medical practices in France, the examination and the gaze of the doctor emerged as a clear horizon of power relations in Western medicine. The gaze, the absolute and true vision of the doctor, would map the body and diagnose the perceived
symptoms that the body supposedly revealed. Through this gaze, the treatment, this practice of truth, could be applied based on perceived maladies bodies produced (Foucault, 1963).

The medical gaze is one of the mechanisms that emerge from the text and the authority of public health officers rests upon medical examinations and the drawing of bodily fluids, even against one’s will, to determine infection or contagion. This power covers everything from tuberculosis to sexually transmitted diseases that can, “cause a medical examination to be made and to take specimens and to isolate a person who refuses to submit to such exam,” under the authority of the public health officers to, “isolate and treat any person found to have such disease (p. 27). Although public health officers are charged under State legal measures to control processes of life and death (evoking it through the biopower of State configurations), it is masked in a discourse of benevolent paternalism, in which public health officers must provide, “food, shelter, and medical assistance… appropriate to the circumstances”, of any person taken under their care during a crisis (p. 26). In this way, the power of life and death dressed in a discourse of public health and safety can organize, disperse, treat, and potentially kill bodies in an efficient matter that keeps traditional State structures in place during a time of crisis in which power might otherwise be subverted or reconfigured differently. The potential of disaster poses a threat to state sovereignty because of the unknown that disaster possesses for its hegemony.

Because of the potential loss of control and power that can occur through a disaster, the State secures broad power in the role(s) of public health officers. Bodies are examined and treated in various ways, even controlling the types of contact appropriate between bodies deemed “healthy” or “sick”.

‘Contact’ means an individual who has been identifies as having been exposed or potentially exposed, to a contagious or possibly contagious individual through such close, prolonged or repeated association with another individual or animal that, in the opinion of the Department there is a risk of such individual contracting the contagious disease. (pp. 11-12).

In this specific excerpt, we see how the State is concerned with affect. Through the idea of “contact” and “proximity” we can think about how bodies come together and the affective relations that emerge from contact. By limiting this contact, States can control the affective potentials of bodies, and one could argue, the ability to contain the potential threat of resistance to draconian social policies at our most vulnerable moments. Although one might imagine that symptoms would have to emerge, the State can isolate bodies even through the suspicion of infection or contact with others who are infected (p. 7). In this way, the threat mobilizes social policy because the potential for contagion or disaster is always present. Everyone is suspect, which in turn allows for oppressive social policies to emerge. It is the politics of affect and the affective responses produced by the threat upon which States mobilize. Texts help make this interaction more clear as they outline exactly how this will eventually, or potentially, emerge; much like the specter of threat that haunts this piece.

Although our concern in this scream lies with the discursive formation known as human, this power over life itself also emerges through three references to nonhuman animals in the text. Although human bodies receive a trial confined to how the State has constructed “justice”, nonhuman animals receive absolutely no protection through State law and are slaughtered under either the perceived threat or after the examination by veterinarians:
The laws governing domestic and other animals harboring diseases that are contagious to humans contain authority for control mechanisms that are similar to those that apply to contagious diseases in humans themselves—investigations, seizures, isolation, quarantine, vaccinations. These laws also authorize the ultimate remedy: the slaughter of the infected animals and any animals that may have been exposed to the disease. (p. 46).

Extending this biopower to the depths of those nonhuman animal experiences reinforces how biopolitics shapes both human and nonhuman with the State at the center of these machinations. The extension of power over the realms of nonhuman animals further legitimizes these practices as the State is seen as the arbiter of ultimate truth that spans natural environments and those created by history or social policy. The italicized point in the quote further extends biopower as an affective force that extends over human and nonhuman alike, with, ultimately in the end, the same techniques of power being performed on animal and human. This demonstrates the cycle of production that links all of life within a particular biopolitical regime that spans spatial, bodily, and epistemological registers.

**Affect After the Fall? A Utopian Imaginary Amidst Imminent Threat**

*Things fall apart; the center cannot hold.*

—W.B. Yeats, “The Second Coming”

For us, Yeats is describing the final undoing, the breaking apart of things, ideas, and institutions: the “center” that has finally come undone; the eschaton slouches towards us, rough beast that it is. This undoing is an ever-present conceptual undertone that also exists in the *N.Y. Manual* since it rests entirely on the notion of a perceived future public health threat: the great undoing of the State. Acknowledged or not, texts have affective resonances and forces that mobilize bodies towards certain ends. Returning to Brian Massumi’s provocative claim that began this scream for us, the affective forces and flows behind the threat is a powerful way in which to mobilize specific relationships of power and configure society towards particular arrangements. What the *N.Y. Manual* demonstrates is how the State would mobilize affective forces and flows of bodies during a time of crisis, but how that specific incantation of biopower emerges through the domain of public health. It is through medicine, the power of public health officers, and the control of bodies that State hegemony will be secured in a time of catastrophe. Quarantine, inoculation, treatment, and if necessary, the destruction bodies is at the heart of the *N.Y. Manual* and the procedures that emerge from it, ultimately relying on spatial strategies and public health officers to put this specific policy into practice. But, even underlying these direct forms of control through legal and health codes, are the affective forces and flows that (re)produce certain bodies; bodies that are to be made utterly expendable through the bureaucratic delineation of plague, infestation, or disease. The text puts forth a terrifying vision in a time of crisis that could potentially produce new ways of thinking; to alter the direction in which society has taken. This type of vision, however, is the affect that arises from the resistance to the vision produced by the *N.Y. Manual*, the radical imaginary to think outside these kinds of conceptions.
When we speak of radical imaginary, it emerges that subjectivities and our own understanding of the limits of bodies is what is at stake in this poignant State legal guide. Affect, the heart of this piece, and the imagination cannot be separated for the conditions they produce. Stephen Shukaitis (2009) has argued that:

Imagination is not ahistorical, derived from nothing, but an ongoing relationship and material capacity constituted by social interactions between bodies. While liberatory impulses might point to a utopian (no)where that is separate from the present, it is necessary to point from somewhere, from a particular situated imagining. Imagination as a composite of our capacities to affect and be affected by the world, to develop movements toward new forms of autonomous sociality and collective self-determination. (p. 10).

He pushes us to construct our own “imaginal machines” that are born from historically situated resistance: comprised of ideologies, ways of knowing, the imagination, and praxis of a given society, allowing discourses of alternative possibilities to arise in the depths and cracks of a highly diffused, hegemonic, and symbolic Empire. Resisting necrotic forms of thinking is at the heart of the strategies that need to be formulated amidst these types of pervasive discursive formations and through a radical imaginary, resistance and alternatives can be rethought. Although the threat is a thing of the future, of what potentially can occur, this does not mean that it infinitely has the capabilities to stifle the creative and affective forces present in bodies. States attempt to harness this towards the will of domination and control. However, for those that want to resist these types of hegemonic forms of power, it becomes essential to rethink strategies of resistance in light of these types of these State biopolitical incantations.

References


**Authors**

Abraham DeLeon is Associate Professor and Assistant Dean for Curriculum and Planning in the Educational Leadership and Policy Studies Department at University of Texas, San Antonio.

Kevin J. Burke is Associate Professor and Program Coordinator, Department of Language and Literacy Education at the University of Georgia.
Critical Education

criticaleducation.org
ISSN 1920-4175

Editors
Stephen Petrina, University of British Columbia
Sandra Mathison, University of British Columbia
E. Wayne Ross, University of British Columbia

Associate Editors
Abraham P. DeLeon, University of Texas at San Antonio
Adam Renner, 1970-2010

Editorial Collective
Faith Ann Agostinone, Aurora University
Wayne Au, University of Washington, Bothell
Jeff Bale, University of Toronto
Theodorea Regina Berry, U of Texas, San Antonio
Amy Brown, University of Pennsylvania
Kristen Buras, Georgia State University
Paul R. Carr, Université du Québec en Outaouais
Lisa Cary, Murdoch University
Anthony J. Castro, University of Missouri, Columbia
Alexander Cuenca, Saint Louis University
Noah De Lissovoy, The University of Texas, Austin
Kent den Heyer, University of Alberta
Gustavo Fischman, Arizona State University
Stephen C. Fleury, Le Moyne College
Derek R. Ford, Syracuse University
Four Arrows, Fielding Graduate University
Melissa Freeman, University of Georgia
David Gabbard, Boise State University
Rich Gibson, San Diego State University
Rebecca Goldstein, Montclair State University
Julie Gorlewski, SUNY at New Paltz
Panayota Gounari, UMass, Boston
Sandy Grande, Connecticut College
Todd S. Hawley, Kent State University
Matt Hern, Vancouver, Canada
Dave Hill, Anglia Ruskin University
Nathalia E. Jaramillo, University of Auckland
Richard Kahn, Antioch University Los Angeles
Kathleen Kesson, Long Island University
Philip E. Kovacs, University of Alabama, Huntsville
Ravi Kumar, South Asia University
Saville Kushner, University of Auckland
Zeus Leonardo, University of California, Berkeley
John Lupinacci, Washington State University
Darren E. Lund, University of Calgary
Curry Stephenson Malott, West Chester University
Gregory Martin, University of Technology, Sydney
Rebecca Martusewicz, Eastern Michigan University
Cris Mayo, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Peter Mayo, University of Malta
Peter McLaren, University of California, Los Angeles
João Paraskeva, UMass, Dartmouth
Jill A. Pinkney Pastrana, U of Minnesota, Duluth
Brad J. Porfilio, California State University, East Bay
Kenneth J. Saltman, UMass, Dartmouth
Doug Selwyn, SUNY at Plattsburgh
Özlem Sensoy, Simon Fraser University
Patrick Shannon, Penn State University
John Smyth, University of Huddersfield
Mark Stern, Colgate University
Beth Sondel, North Carolina State University
Hannah Spector, Penn State University, Harrisburg
Linda Ware, SUNY at Geneseo