Tongue-Tied

Imperialism and Second Language Education in the United States

Jeff Bale
Michigan State University


Abstract

This article responds to a conspicuous blind spot in scholarship and commentary on language education policy in the United States. This oversight obtains as much in theoretical terms as in errant readings of the historical record of language education policy and practice. To illuminate this blind spot, I structure the article in four parts. I begin by reviewing the resource debate over language education policy. Second, I contribute to that debate by way of the classical Marxist theory of imperialism and elaborate its social, ideological and linguistic dynamics. Third, I explore this theoretical position by contrasting two key moments in the history of U.S. second language policy and practice. Finally, I maintain that despite the focus on historical contexts, this analysis implicates a fundamental re-orientation of contemporary language education policy scholarship and advocacy if either is to contribute in deed to a more multilingual and just society.
Schooling in the United States confronts a particularly acute paradox. On the one hand, our schools are the most linguistically diverse they have been since the turn of the 20th century. At last count, some 5.12 million children, around 10.5% of the total P-12 population, were officially classified as *limited English proficient*\(^1\) (García, Kleifgen & Falchi, 2008). This figure by definition excludes students who are fluent in additional languages and English, suggesting an even more multilingual student population. Moreover, 50 years’ worth of applied linguistic research on second language acquisition, pedagogy and policy has deeply enriched our understanding of the factors that support language learning, and the individual and societal benefits of multilingualism. On the other hand, however, myths about the historical and contemporary status of English in the U.S. and its schools dominate contemporary political and educational discourse. Such attitudes accompany a relentless shift towards English-only models of schooling, even in contexts where local policy still endorses bilingual education (see Menken, 2008).

García (1992) has characterized the policy responses to this paradox as a “schizophrenic double-bind” (p. 15). At one extreme, a series of language education policies exists that restricts the use in education of non-English community languages. These policies (viz., in Arizona, California and Massachusetts) ensure that students develop English language proficiency and literacy at the expense of the home language (see Wiley & Wright, 2004). Moreover, the 2001 reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act marked the abolition of the Bilingual Education Act of 1968, symbolically silencing bilingual education in federal education policy (García, 2009; Hornberger, 2006). At the other extreme, a parallel set of policies exists to promote foreign language education, almost universally in the name of U.S. geopolitical bearing and economic competitiveness. In particular, the figurative “war on terror,” the literal wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as President Obama’s escalation of both to include intermittent bombing of Yemen and Pakistan, have rekindled old anxieties about capacity in what the federal government calls *critical languages*.\(^2\) As one response to this anxiety, former President Bush proposed the National Security Language Initiative in 2006 to reinvigorate long-standing federal policies to develop advanced proficiency in critical languages across the K-16 system. Bush described his initiative in no uncertain terms: “This program is part of a strategic goal, and that is to protect this country in the short term and protect it in the long term by spreading freedom. We’re facing an ideological struggle and we’re going to win” (cited in Capriccioso & Epstein, 2006, n.p.). Schizophrenia presents not just from these contradictory policy aims, but rather is exacerbated insofar as the community language to be displaced by English and the critical language to be taught are often the very same language.

These conflicted policy aims (i.e., English-only mandates for educating emergent bilinguals while promoting critical language education in service of national security) impose urgent questions on scholars and practitioners of language education in the United States. How

\(^1\) *Limited English proficient* is the official term in federal policy to refer to a student not yet fluent in English. The deficit orientation in the term is obvious. As such, in this article I use *emergent bilingual*, put forward by García (2009).

\(^2\) For example, Arabic, Farsi (Persian), Hindi/Urdu, Pashto, Putonghua (Chinese), Russian, the Turkic languages.
are we to explain – and not just describe – these contradictory policy aims? On what basis, to what end, and in whose interests do we resolve that contradiction, both theoretically and in practice, so as to realize a more multilingual and just society? I offer this paper as one response to such pressing theoretical issues. To be clear, my concern here is not with forwarding another defense of multilingualism or bilingual education (see Tochon, 2009 for a recent, award-winning example of such); that the reader appreciates their individual and societal merits is assumed. Rather, the focus is on what I argue to be a conspicuous blind spot in scholarship and commentary on language education policy in the United States. This blind spot obtains as much in theoretical terms as in errant readings of the historical record of language education policy and practice.

To illuminate this blind spot, I structure this article in four parts. I begin by reviewing language education policy research and the resource debate over bilingual, heritage, and critical language policy. Second, I contribute to that debate by way of the classical Marxist theory of imperialism and elaborate its social, ideological and linguistic dynamics. I use this theoretical discussion to identify a trenchant historical correlation, namely: moments in which the state projects its power internationally co-occur with language education policies (both formal and informal) that restrict or repress minority language practice at home. The converse also applies: those moments when popular movements challenge imperial projects co-occur with expansion of multilingual practice and policies to support such practice. Third, I explore this hypothesis by contrasting two key moments in the history of U.S. second language policy and practice. As I argue below, reconsidering these two eras with the framework proposed here challenges several key historical narratives that dominate applied linguistic and policy scholarship. Finally, I maintain that despite the focus on historical contexts, this analysis implicates a fundamental re-orientation of contemporary language education policy scholarship and advocacy if either is to contribute in deed to a more multilingual and just society.

**Language Education and the Resource Debate**

*Language-as-Resource*

The predominant framework in the U.S. literature for understanding language education policy construes languages and their speakers as a resource, drawing on the seminal tripartite analysis of language policy orientations elaborated by Ruiz (1984). Ruiz identifies three language-planning orientations (i.e., language as problem, right, and resource) that reflect underlying ideological assumptions about language and its place in society. Certainly, the resource orientation has been widely promoted as an approach to language education policy because of its social justice implications: it reframes multilingual and/or non-English proficiency as an asset to cultivate, not a deficit to redress; and it holds the potential to alleviate conflict between emergent bilinguals and English monolinguals insofar as both have valuable linguistic resources to share with the other. However, often left out of discussions of the resource orientation is the second part of Ruiz’s definition, which frames language as a resource for economic advancement, military preparedness and foreign policy.
More recently, Ruiz (2010) has revisited the resource orientation in light of multiple critiques of his original thesis. Unfortunately, his remarks only confound the framework’s ambiguity. For example, given the extensive treatment in applied linguistic journals since September 11, 2001 of language policy tied to national security, it is noteworthy that Ruiz does not address this aspect of the resource metaphor. Ruiz does explore the relationship between the rights and resource orientations to language. However, the balance of his comments reasserts that language-as-resource will mean different things to different people. This leaves the central ambiguity inherent in the resource orientation unresolved: if language is a resource, then to what ends and in whose interests? Further, can we employ language education to meet multiple ends and serve multiple interests at once, or do some in fact predominate?

The Resource Debate

The implications of those very questions have been the subject of growing scrutiny. In exploring this debate, it is deceptively easy to frame it as two camps arguing with one another. For example, there is a segment of the language education community that has consistently advocated language education primarily to fulfill U.S. military, economic, and political needs (e.g., Brecht, 2007; Brecht & Rivers, 2000; Edwards, 2004; O’Connell & Norwood, 2007). Here, improved language education is subordinated to national interests that the authors assume we all share and endorse. By contrast, a second set of language education policy research interrogates the entanglement of the resource orientation with U.S. national interests. For example, Ricento (2005) questions not the orientation itself, but rather how scholars, practitioners and policy makers employ it. He challenges language education advocates to clarify “hegemonic ideologies associated with the roles of non-English languages in national life” (p. 349) in how they frame their advocacy. Petrovic (2005), extending Michael Apple’s work, links his analysis of the resource metaphor to the conservative restoration of U.S. power. With respect to language education, this neo-conservative offensive centers on anti-bilingual education initiatives. Petrovic acknowledges that the resource approach aims to counter attacks on bilingual education. But because such an approach identifies with economic and political interests as elites define them, it bolsters the same ideological framework that it intends to challenge.

More often, considerations of language education policy and the resource orientation are conflicted. For example, Kramsch (2005) reviews the historical intersection of foreign language research with economic, cultural and defense interests. She scrutinizes how linguists have found themselves ensnared in these national interests. As her analysis turns to the post-9/11 context, however, the argument shifts. Kramsch does critique the “current appropriation of academic knowledge by state power” (p. 557), referring to language policies tied to national security. In the same paragraph, however, she argues that, “No one would deny that it is the prerogative of a nation state to rally the expertise of its scientists for its national defense” (p. 557). These statements are contradictory: if such a right is undeniable, then on what basis do we evaluate what makes one appropriation of academic knowledge in the name of national defense reasonable and another risky?

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3 For example, the semi-annual Perspectives section of The Modern Language Journal has convened discussion on this topic in no fewer than five issues between 2003 and 2007.
A second example, Reagan (2002), relates more specifically to critical languages. Reagan wagers a compelling argument acknowledging the profound impact that race, class, and language variation have on the language classroom. As he turns to critical languages, however, Reagan invokes “the geopolitical aspect” of language education and argues that it is in society’s interest to develop capacity “in the various national and regional languages that are used in areas of national political, economic, and strategic concern” (p. 42). Referencing September 11, Reagan continues:

_Our_ need to understand others in the world provides another justification for studying the less commonly taught languages, since the languages themselves play an essential role in _our_ ability to understand the speech communities that use them. (p. 42, researcher emphasis)

The sharpness of Reagan’s earlier discussion dulls once the conversation turns to critical languages and national security. Now, there does exist a set of undifferentiated interests: _our_ interests. Because _our_ is not defined, it is unclear whether the racial, class, and linguistic differences Reagan had critiqued are again subordinated to dominant national identities and interests.

In a direct reply to Petrovic (2005), McGroarty (2006) defends the resource orientation from a tactical perspective. She cites a standard text on general policy analysis to argue for language policy advocacy that employs a variety of rationales. Referencing the cyclical nature of policy discussions, McGroarty maintains:

A logical implication for those who consider themselves pragmatists or political realists is that advocates for positive language-in-education policies must constantly articulate the value of bilingualism, and be able to do so in varied terms that respond to a protean environment of public discussion. Scholars need to build a strong normative case for the nature and meaning of language considered as a right…at the same time, policymakers must hear from advocates who can articulate multiple rationales. (pp. 5-6)

Her argument aggravates a tension between principle and pragmatism. The very separation of normative, rights-based arguments from those aimed at policy makers implies that the former carry less weight, if any, in the policy process. This concession recalls the ambiguity in the resource orientation itself, namely can multiple definitions of it coexist, or do some outweigh others? Furthermore, this concession seems to confirm Petrovic’s (2005) argument: by adapting to the constraints of fickle policy environments – instead of challenging them – we risk strengthening them.

I would argue that the greater share of commentary and scholarly work on language education policy loses its way in this analytical blind spot. The literature reflects a conflicted mix of critical arguments and those that position language learning as a resource for meeting ill-defined national interests. I agree with Ricento (2005) and Petrovic (2005) that any effort to clarify the resource orientation must specify to what ends and in whose interest federal policies frame languages and their speakers. In that spirit, I argue that the classical Marxist theories of imperialism and attendant nationalism offer the most useful framework to specify and reframe the resource orientation to language education and to policy advocacy.
In the following section, I describe those theories and their connection to language education. My discussion frequently quotes original texts from this tradition because it has been so particularly absent in applied linguistic study of language education policy. Or, when present, there is evidence of scant engagement with key texts. For example, the only references to the classical Marxist tradition cited in Fishman’s (1972) seminal essay on language and nationalism are three letters Engels wrote on nationalism to the editor of an English-language periodical. Instead, Fishman relies on limited secondary literature, and tucks his discussion of Marxism and nationalism in an endnote. Likewise, Phillipson’s (1992) contested notion of linguistic imperialism hangs an entire intellectual tradition of theorizing imperialism on one pamphlet by Lenin before dismissing that tradition outright. Consequently, the following section condenses a rich intellectual and political tradition into a brief narrative, and connects that tradition to language education and policy.

**Marxism, Imperialism, and Language**

The classical Marxist tradition of theorizing imperialism turns on a central contradiction that Lenin (1986) identifies in 1913:

Developing capitalism knows two historical tendencies in the national question. The first is the awakening of national life and national movements, the struggle against all national oppression, and the creation of national states. The second is the development and growing frequency of international intercourse in every form, the breakdown of national barriers, the creation of the international unity of capital, of economic life in general, of politics, science, etc. (p. 94)

How this contradiction expresses itself varies over time and context, but it flows from capital’s need for a specific material and social infrastructure, most often organized through the structure of the nation-state.

In material terms the state initially unified domestic markets to ensure successful capitalist development at the national level. Reaching a domestic market required a certain degree of political unity that could displace feudal or absolutist state mechanisms that had otherwise thwarted economic development. In social terms, one aspect of this unification included marshaling linguistic resources, specifically the invention and imposition of standardized languages. Whether or not such language invention preceded or followed consolidation of state power (see Harman, 1992; Hobsbawm, 1990), consolidation of bourgeois power in the form of the nation-state implicated a parallel consolidation of standardized national languages. The consequence: an almost universal formula that Xians speak Xish in Xland.4

However, mere standardization has not proven sufficient to capitalism. Rather, a monolingual regime has also emerged asserting that Xians speak only Xish in Xland. In most cases, full membership in Xian society is predicated, at least in part, on proficiency in Xish. As Hobsbawm (1990) noted about the French revolution, at issue is rarely whether someone is a native speaker of Xish, but rather whether that individual is willing to acquire Xish in a bid for

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4 Although these formulations are mine, I must acknowledge Fishman and his use of Xmen speaking Xish in the Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale for understanding language loss and revitalization.
membership in Xian society. Further, in almost every instance school is a primary institution in which monolingualism in Xish is enforced. These dynamics at once construct and reify hegemonic beliefs about monolingualism as both a natural and ideal condition, and a requisite index of national identity. Such beliefs are especially pernicious given that—after three centuries of the modern nation-state—monolingualism in practice remains the minority human experience (cf. Anderson, 2006; Fishman, 1972; Gellner, 1983; Harman, 1992; Hobsbawm, 1990; Löwy, 1975; May, 2001; Wiley, 1999).

Behind this initial marshaling of material and social resources, economic development has unfolded in ways that require as much as transfigure the nation-state. Not only does capital tend to concentrate in the hands of fewer monopolies, but also those monopolies’ demands for markets and resources outgrow national borders. In the context of World War I, Lenin (1916/1963) deepens this analysis by understanding that colonization, or imperialism as he defines it, leads not only to wealthy nations exploiting poor nations in search of new markets and resources. Instead, competition over those markets and resources engenders economic, political, social, and ultimately military conflict among wealthy nations as well.

These basic terms of the classical Marxist understanding of the nation-state and imperialism have been subject(ed) to endless criticism as overly reductive and fatalistic. The kernel of truth to such critique can be found in debates within the Marxist tradition against reformism and Stalinism (and its Maoist variant); those debates were largely resolved in the negative insofar as reformism (e.g., the parties of the Second International), and the former Soviet Union, its own empire, and the network of political parties it influenced, dominated left discourse for most of the 20th century. Of course, each claimed sole proprietorship over Marxist thought (for discussion of each tradition with respect to imperialism, see Harman, 1992; Löwy, 1976; Munck, 1986, especially ch. 2-5).

A competent understanding of the Marxist tradition of theorizing imperialism, however, couples a political-economic analysis of competition among wealthy nations over the spoils of the world with a dynamic understanding of nationalism. Such an approach begins with Marx and Engels themselves. To be sure, they never develop a complete theory of imperialism or nationalism, and in several instances they are wrong. Nevertheless, their later work does begin to sketch out a theory of national oppression, particularly its consequences within the aggressor state. For example, in his analysis of Russian oppression of Poland, Engels argues:

A people that oppresses others cannot emancipate itself. The power that leads to the oppression of others always turns back against itself in the end. As long as Russian soldiers remain in Poland, the Russian people cannot free themselves either politically or socially. (Marx & Engels, 1874/1973, p. 527, researcher translation)

Marx raises a similar argument in his analysis of English oppression of Ireland: “Ultimately, England today is seeing a repetition of what happened on a massive scale in ancient

5 Particularly Engels and his reliance on Hegel’s notion of “non-historic” nations to understand national oppression. See Anderson (2010) for an exhaustive investigation of Marx and Engels’ developing analyses on nationalism.
Rome. A nation that enslaves another forges its own chains” (Marx & Engels, 1870/1975, p. 417, researcher translation). According to this tentative analysis, the same power that exerts itself across national borders maintains society as it is at home.

Lenin (1914/1972, 1986) develops these initial sketches through repeated examinations of the experiences of imperialism and national oppression in cultural, religious and linguistic terms. Central to his analysis is a dynamic understanding of nationalism that distinguishes the nationalism of aggressor nations from that of oppressed nations. He insists that oppressed nations have the right to determine their own fate politically, culturally and otherwise. With respect to language and education, Lenin (1913/1977, 1986) advocates the rights of oppressed peoples consumed by empire to receive education in their home language. He does so primarily in a polemic against Austrian Marxist Otto Bauer’s schemes for schools segregated by nationality in the name of cultural national autonomy. In this debate, Lenin calls for multinational and multilingual curricula within the same school as a tool for integration and overcoming national barriers. For example, in a discussion of data on the national origin of pupils in St. Petersburg, he cites as practical strategies “the hiring at state expense of special teachers of Hebrew, Jewish history and the like, of the provisions of state owned premises for lectures for Jewish, Armenian, or Romanian children, or even for the one Georgian child in one area of St. Petersburg” (Lenin, 1986, p. 110).

Lenin’s argument is based on the following principle:

To preach establishment of special national schools for every “national culture” is reactionary. But under real democracy it is quite possible to ensure instruction in the native language, in native history, and so forth, without splitting up the schools according to nationality. (1913/1977, p. 532)

The point is not to exalt one culture or language over another. Rather, in coupling formal legal equality among various nationalities with concrete affirmative provisions, the goal is to overcome national divisions, and the animosity they engender, so as to create conditions for cultural and linguistic integration on a free, voluntary basis. In addition to synthesizing political principle with practical strategies, Lenin’s response to imperialism and the national question rejects ahistorical or essentialized notions of national culture or language. Such theoretical fluidity ensures both the principled defense of oppressed nationalities and their languages while allowing for – indeed embracing – generative integration of culture and language on a basis of equity.

More recent scholarship (e.g., Brenner, 2006; Callinicos, 2009; Harman, 2003; Harvey, 2005; Meiksins Wood, 2005; Panitch & Leys, 2004) has re-assessed classical Marxist theories of imperialism, at once rescuing that tradition from the hangover of reformism, Stalinism and Maoism, and pursuing important debates about the contours of contemporary imperialism. While most of this work hews closely to analysis of political economy, Harvey (2005), for example, examines what he calls the “inner dialectic of U.S. civil society” (p. 12). He situates the drive toward internal repression within the propensity for elites to resolve economic crisis through external conflict. Harvey identifies at several historical moments the tendency of the U.S. state “to mobilize nationalism, jingoism, patriotism, and, above all, racism behind an imperial project” (p. 44). Understanding that each of the –isms on Harvey’s list has its own unique features, for ease of discussion, I will refer to them collectively as chauvinism.
Of course, it is far easier to marshal popular support for a specific imperial endeavor once a putative enemy has been transformed into an Other: a member of an inferior race or nationality, in need of liberation or civilization, or condemned altogether to annihilation by the aggressor nation. However, the projection of chauvinism abroad has its own consequences at home. These consequences play out in two seemingly paradoxical ways. The first acknowledges that most of the benefits, yet virtually none of the risk, attendant to imperialism accrue to economic and political elites. While ruling elites declare war, they do not generally fight those wars themselves. And as has been documented in many analyses of neoliberal economic policy, the benefits of economic forms of imperial competition have trickled (or better: flooded) upward to ruling elites over the last 35 years in fantastically disproportionate ways. Chauvinism, inasmuch as it enforces a national identity rooted in specific ethnic or racial, linguistic, and/or religious criteria, aims to unite all members of the aggressor nation. It therefore plays a central ideological role in imperialist conflict in masking the disproportionate distribution of risk and reward to popular and elite members of the aggressor nation, respectively.

The second dimension pertains to the general role that oppression plays in class society, whereby animosities engendered between working people of various ethnic, racial, gender, and sexual identities, among others, prevent the social and political unity that might in fact challenge class oppression overall. Chauvinism thus functions in two directions at once: it identifies an Other abroad, and mobilizes members of the aggressor nation across class lines in opposition to that Other; but also, it targets those individuals and groups at home who do not qualify as members of the dominant national identity. To be clear, the argument is not that imperialist conflict necessarily creates racial, ethnic, or other forms of social oppression in society; such oppression is an extant feature of modern capitalism in general. Rather, the chauvinism that accompanies imperialist conflict aggravates extant divisions among ordinary people along any number of social lines.

While Harvey’s list of –isms implies the linguistic consequences of chauvinism, I will be explicit: namely that a central component of U.S. imperialism is the mobilization of English monolingualism on ideological and practical terms. That is, if there exists in general an entanglement of the nation-state with monolingual practice and beliefs, then imperialism only tightens the knot. As discussed above, the chauvinism attendant to U.S. imperialism not only enforces a specific national identity, but also requires that this identity be expressed in English. Furthermore, at moments of overt war, proficiency in English is positioned as patriotic and a sign of loyalty, while the practice of – let alone education in – “foreign” languages is deemed suspect. Consequently, and to re-iterate the central hypothesis that informs this paper: historical moments in which U.S. imperialism is ascendant hang together with restrictive language policies, whether formal or informal. The expansion of U.S. power externally constricts internal ideological and implementational space (Hornberger, 2006) for the practice of and education in minority languages. The converse also holds, namely: moments when U.S. imperialism withers hang together with the expansion of ideological and implementational space for policies that support the practice of and education in minority languages.

In the following section, I explore this hypothesis in a contrast of two distinct eras in the history of second language education in the United States, specifically: Americanization and the rise of U.S. imperialism at the turn of the 20th century; and the Chicano civil rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s. My argument is threefold. First, each case represents a salient example of the framework described above. Second, using this framework to understand sociohistorical
contexts of second language education in fact challenges several dominant narratives in applied linguistic and policy scholarship about this history. Third, if there is any validity to this framework as elaborated here and explored in these two cases, then it not only clarifies the ambiguities inherent in the resource metaphor as discussed above, but also suggests a re-orientation of contemporary language policy advocacy. I elaborate this third point in the conclusion to the paper.

**Imperialism & Language Education Policy and Practice**

**Americanization and the Rise of U.S. Imperialism**

The term *Americanization* operates in the literature in a somewhat imprecise way. On the one hand, it refers to a formal federal campaign after World War I that sponsored citizenship and English language classes for adult immigrants (see McClymer, 1980). On the other, it is a term used broadly to refer to education policies and practices that emerged during the last historical period in which schools were as culturally and linguistically diverse as today, namely around the turn of the 20th century. As has been well documented, while some 35 million immigrants entered the country between 1815 and 1915, there was a significant shift after 1885 as immigration increased from Southern and Eastern Europe. Although the literature on Americanization tends to focus on European immigration to the East and Midwest, immigration to what became the western U.S. increased at this time as well, as people from Mexico and East Asia relocated in significant numbers (Johnson, 2002).

Of greater concern here than terminological precision are two dominant narratives in historical and applied linguistic literature that describe the educational experiences of emergent bilingual children during this era. The first of these, originally told in Kloss’s (1977/1998) seminal history of bilingual education and Heath’s (1981) early work on comparative language policy analysis, and reiterated most recently by Mirel (2010), Petrovic (2010), Ramsey (2010), and Salamone (2010), characterizes U.S. language policy up through the 1880s as essentially *laissez-faire*. No formal policies existed either to restrict or to promote non-English languages, and there was general tolerance of the practice of such languages. Of course, this narrative is accurate only insofar as it excludes (in)formal policies towards the languages of enslaved Africans and their descendants (see Weinberg, 1977). Besides the obvious omission, if this general characterization is in fact correct, then it must also account for the decidedly intolerant language education policies imposed from 1880s onward.

The history of those policies has been reported elsewhere, but to recall, it includes three primary facets. The first is the general attitude towards European immigrants in the East and Midwest. Supporters of Americanization viewed schools as a venue that could contribute to the solution of putative social problems of ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity. Not only should schools produce workers equipped with the skills required by an industrial, urban economy, but also they should provide a common curricular and cultural experience (i.e., Anglo-Saxon and English-speaking) to counter the ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity of immigrant children (see Carlson, 1987; Weiss, 1982). Second, these restrictive policies impacted Native youth primarily through the institution of the boarding school, the first of which opened in Carlisle, PA in 1879. Children from various Native nations were purposely schooled together to make communication in their native languages and the maintenance of their cultures more difficult. As Crawford (1992) has documented, eradicating Native languages and supplanting them with
English ranked among the primary aims of boarding schools. Further, and as is typical of colonial-settler projects, federal policy documents and administrators portrayed the forcible removal of Native children’s language and culture as a civilizing mission. Finally, Americanization practices in the West and Southwest mirrored more closely the institutionalized exclusion of Native students than it did “melting pot” practices more common in the East and Midwest. Indeed, a dual system of segregated schools was established that prepared some Anglo students for their future role as leaders and owners, while training most Mexican and Asian students for life as workers (see Cohen, 1974; González, 1990, ch. 2 and 7). Even in conditions of complete segregation, the expectation was to supplant the native language with English. Given these well-documented historical experiences, there is a particular explanatory burden placed on the narrative described above, namely: if a general attitude of tolerance prevailed over (roughly) the first century of U.S. history, then how do we account for – and not just describe – the emergence of overt, formal policies from the late 19th century onward to restrict and repress the practice of non-English languages?

The second dominant narrative describing this era focuses on the fate of German language education in the lead up and aftermath of World War I. As the war approached, the political dynamics of Americanization shifted to equate learning English with loyalty. By contrast, diversity was taught as unpatriotic (Herman, 1992). Wiley (1998) presented an extensive account of the hysteria surrounding German and German Americans during the war, which included: purges of German language titles from public libraries; dismissal of entire German language university faculty; public assaults, including tarring and feathering, on German Americans and German religious minorities such as the Mennonites; and support from the National Education Association for anti-German and English-only medium of instruction policies. German language instruction was criminalized in two states, and the number of states with English-only medium of instruction policies doubled from 17 in 1913 to 34 in 1923.

The fate of German language education during World War I clearly exemplifies one aspect of the hypothesis this paper explores. Accompanying U.S. involvement in the war and projection of its newfound power on the international stage were specific and ongoing campaigns to denounce all things German. Despite, or perhaps because of, the demographic prominence of German Americans, their culture, customs and language were now branded not only inherently foreign, but also inherently seditious. To be sure, German Americans were not the only target of this wartime panic, nor was linguistic difference the only battleground. McClymer (1980) catalogues the multiple facets of the internal repression that accompanied U.S. involvement in the war. Anti-German chauvinism intersected with: the rebirth of the Ku Klux Klan in 1915; the 1916 presidential campaign, in which Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson attempted to out-flank each other in terms of assimilation policy; the sedition and espionage prosecutions of 1916-1917; the Red Summer of race riots against African Americans in 1919; the “American Plan” of anti-unionism, including the Palmer Raids in 1919, which mobilized anti-immigrant and anti-communist sentiment to deport thousands of immigrants suspected of radical left activism; and the 1920 trial and subsequent execution of Italian anarchists Sacco and Vanzetti. It is within this general repressive context, what McClymer (1980) called a negative revolution in terms of the extent of racism and reaction that characterized the period, that English language practice served as a proxy for loyalty to the United States and as a requirement for inclusion into U.S. society in general. Public use of non-English languages, let alone formal education in them, was tantamount to an act of sedition. High school foreign language enrollments as Watzke (2003)
reported them give a sense of the impact of this general wartime anxiety on German language study and second language education overall. Secondary level German language enrollments, until 1914 the most popular modern language studied in high school, plummeted in 1921 to 1.2% of all foreign language enrollments – and essentially never recovered.

As referenced above, mine is not the first paper to discuss the impact of this specific war on second language education (e.g., Herman, 1992). However clear this particular case of wartime language anxiety may be, it would be simplistic to limit the analysis of the relationship between imperialism and second language education to this singular moment. Indeed, there still remains the conundrum of squaring the narrative of laissez-faire language policy through the 1880s with the first decades of Americanization in schools across the U.S. The extant literature on this era generally limits its analysis to the level of description: on the one hand, nativist racism6 fueled the shift from laissez-faire attitudes towards restrictive language education policies and practices; on the other, that same racism boiled over into outright panic as World War I approached. The questions remain, however, whence that racism and why it predominated in this particular era.

Addressing these questions in terms of the hypothesis that guides this paper requires expanding our understanding of imperialism from discrete military conflicts (here: World War I) to a broader process, described in the previous section, of economic, social and at times military conflict. In this sense, then, World War I marked a culmination of a more complex process in which the U.S. developed into an imperial power. This ascendancy was rooted in four dynamics. The first was the meteoric rise of the U.S. economy, which by 1900 was the largest and most productive in the world (Lens, 1971/2003, pp. 151-152). Second, the federal state consolidated its power by means of the Civil War. With the abolition of slavery came the dismantling of non-capitalist economic relations in the South, and the imposition of political power rooted in an industrialized economy in the North. Both developments led to a more stable federal state able to assert its control over the entire U.S. polity (see Harman, 1999, pp. 345-354). Third, while Manifest Destiny as policy was declared much earlier in the 19th century, it would not be successfully realized until after the Civil War. Westward expansion was a twofold process that included extermination or marginalization of Native nations, and formal war with Mexico to establish control over specific territories. This process of U.S. territorial expansion mirrored the colonial projects of its European counterparts (see Callinicos, 2009, pp. 151ff). The fourth and final aspect was the projection of U.S. power across the Western Hemisphere. As with westward expansion, formal declaration of the right of the U.S. to police the region (i.e., the Monroe Doctrine) occurred earlier in the 19th century, but was not practiced until much later. The pretense of protecting the region from European incursion facilitated both rapid expansion of U.S. capital investment and repeated military interventions in Central America and the Caribbean, with the Spanish-American War of 1898 the most ambitious among them. In its victory, the U.S. acquired territory (the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Guam, and later Guantánamo Bay), and established a military presence on two fronts (see Lens, 1971/2003, pp. 236-274). That presence would expand immensely after World War I, a conflict that Lens (1971/2003) characterized as the “the big leap” in U.S. imperialism (p. 236).

6 I specify nativism here because, again, racism towards enslaved Africans and their descendants and its impact on language policy is almost entirely absent from the literature on this topic.
To be clear, the rise of U.S. imperialism unfolded in fits and starts, not as a linear ascension. Important struggles – from radical reconstruction in the South and the anti-racist politics of the Wobblies as they organized industrial workers across the West, to the Philippine Insurrection (1899-1902) against U.S. occupation and the 1 million votes cast in 1920 for Socialist Party presidential candidate Eugene Debs while in jail for his stance against World War I – interrupted and in fact challenged the consolidation of U.S. power. In other words, there was nothing automatic or pre-ordained about how U.S. imperialism gathered. Nevertheless, by expanding our understanding of imperialism from merely an engagement in this or that war to a much broader economic and political dynamic of conflict and competition among wealthy nations to distribute power among them over the rest of world, we are able to make sense not only of the hysteria surrounding the German language during World War I, but also of the general trend towards cultural and linguistic homogenization imposed primarily through schooling.

That trend, in fact, begins to appear before the end of laissez-faire attitudes as described in the literature. Besides (in)formal policies towards enslaved Africans and their descendants, efforts to restrict non-English language practice and education date as far back as the 1830s. Interestingly, in many cases those efforts not only failed, but resulted in formal policies supporting instruction in non-English languages, as was the case with German in Ohio (Wiley, 1998, p. 216). Antebellum restriction of minority language practice was often deeply interwoven with anti-Catholic chauvinism, particularly in the case of the Know-Nothing Party, which emerged in the 1850s but faded as the Civil War broke out. Furthermore, it is irrefutable that anti-German hysteria during World War I marked the end of German as a prominent community language in the United States. However, German-medium schooling was already in decline from the 1870s onward, targeted as much on linguistic terms as it was for its association with Catholicism. Indeed, a second, post-bellum round of formal policies to restrict German-medium schooling occurred; this time, those efforts generally succeeded (see Wiley, 1998, pp. 216ff). Therefore, just as U.S. imperialism rose in fits and starts from the second half of the 19th century, culminating with “the big leap” after World War I, we might also re-consider the emergence of Americanization as one that occurred in fits and starts. Specifically, the two processes unfolded in strikingly parallel ways: as external U.S. power expanded (insofar as “external” includes economic growth and conflicts with Native nations, Mexico, Spain and the Central Powers), the internal enforcement of a singular national identity – one expressed in English only – became ever stricter.

In fact, when we consider this period in the history of second language education in the U.S. using the framework advocated here, the entire laissez-faire narrative comes into question. This narrative acknowledges the general association of the nation-state and monolingualism in terms similar to those outlined in the previous section. It assumes that, although the power to enforce English monolingualism existed in the United States from the beginning, it simply did not: it let non-English languages be. By contrast, my reading leads to a different conclusion: not that this power did not enforce English monolingualism, but rather that it could not. As with the laissez-faire narrative, my reading also assumes a general association of the nation-state and monolingualism. However, it suggests that the power to enforce a specific U.S. identity expressed in English only had not yet consolidated in a generalized way throughout most of the 19th century. As that power gathered, particularly around the flashpoints indicated above (i.e., economic dominance, westward expansion and war with Mexico, the Civil War, the Spanish-
American War, adventurism in Latin America, and World War I), a parallel process of consolidating and enforcing a specific national – and monolingual – identity unfolded as well. In other words, the general association of the nation-state and monolingualism has always been present in the United States;\(^7\) whether that entanglement was tauter or slacker varied as the U.S. began to project its power abroad. By World War I, however, the U.S. had arrived as a bona fide world power, which effectively tightened the knot of monolingualism at home.

To reiterate a point made earlier: there was nothing pre-ordained or automatic about the consolidation of U.S. imperial power or the attendant imposition of a national, monolingual identity. Earlier, I mentioned specific points of resistance to this consolidation. The following section, however, recalls another era of resistance. It explores the second part of my hypothesis regarding the inverse relationship between withering U.S. imperial power and the expansion of ideological and implementational space for minority language education and practice. It is in the contrast between the above reading and the one I present below that implications for contemporary language education advocacy can be found, which I discuss in the conclusion to the paper.

**The Chicano Civil Rights Movement and Bilingual Education**

The Chicano civil rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s forced a radical shift in the education of emergent bilingual students. The Chicano movement developed in many ways as a rejection of the liberal agenda of assimilation that dominated Mexican-American political groups after World War II (I. García, 1997; San Miguel, 2001). Persistent segregation, poverty and racism against Mexican Americans exposed the limits of assimilationist goals, as well as divergent political strategies between middle and working class Mexican Americans (Chacón & Davis, 2006; San Miguel, 2001). As Ignacio García (1997) described it: “In their [Chicano activists’] eyes, American institutions, such as the government, schools, churches, and social agencies, had failed. American institutions, as far as activists were concerned, were inherently racist” (p. 10). Rediscovering and revitalizing Chicano history, including the Spanish language, became a primary goal. Importantly, this movement was as much one of descendants of Mexicans indigenous to the territories the U.S. annexed in the 19\(^{th}\) century, as of (im)migrants.

Indeed, Chicano struggles over schooling were central to the movement (Barrera, 1974; I. García, 1997; San Miguel, 2004). Considering the schooling conditions Mexican American youth faced, it is no wonder why. Although segregation of Mexican American students was outlawed de jure, it was de facto the norm. In 1960, only 13% of Mexican American students held a high school diploma and only 6% attended college (I. García, 1997). The average Mexican American student had a 7\(^{th}\) grade education, and in Texas the dropout rate was 89% (O. García, 2009). Mexican Americans were often pushed into remedial, vocational and ROTC tracks, or pushed out of school altogether. Speaking Spanish was outlawed almost universally, disciplined by paddling, soap in the mouth and other forms of corporal punishment. Quotas were common for the number of Mexican American athletes or cheerleaders, even in schools where Mexican American students were in the majority (I. García, 1997).

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\(^7\) See Lepore (2002) for discussion of efforts by some prominent Americans during the early national period of U.S. history to enforce literacy and monolingualism in an “American” language.
In response to these conditions, bilingual and bicultural education reforms became central demands of a movement comprised largely of local, school-based struggles. The first bilingual program actually began at the Coral Way Elementary School in Miami in 1963 (Garcia, 2009; Petrovic, 2010). Of course, the context for this program (i.e., elite exiles from the Cuban revolution) was entirely different from what Mexican Americans in the Southwest faced. Nevertheless, Coral Way served as a model for bilingual programs elsewhere, which increased by one’s and two’s up to 1968 in Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California. Winning these programs, however, often required organized and intentional resistance. The history of this resistance indicates three points that characterized the impact of the Chicano civil rights movement on schooling and second language education, which I consider below.

First, students were the primary agents in this resistance. In March 1968, for example, students walked out of five high schools in East Los Angeles. These actions followed efforts to use petitions and participation at school board meetings to present a series of student demands, including a citizens review board of schools with majority Chicano enrollment, an increase of Chicano personnel in those schools, and authorizing the citizen board to develop bilingual and bicultural programs based on a school-community partnership. A report in the March 17, 1968 edition of the Los Angeles Times described the protests as “a week and a half of walkouts, speeches, sporadic lawbreaking, arrests, demands, picketing, sympathy demonstrations, sit-ins, police tactical alerts, and emergency sessions of the school board” (Torgerson, 1968, cited in Muñoz, 1974). Overall, some 12,000 students participated in the walkouts (Weinberg, 1977), which ultimately led to the enactment of many of the original demands, including the oversight board and the implementation of bilingual-bicultural programs. Not only did drop out rates decline dramatically, but the East Los Angeles walkouts became a model that Chicano activists across the Southwest would emulate (Muñoz, 1974).

Throughout 1969 in Crystal City, Texas, students organized in the hundreds to present petitions at a number of school board meetings, which the all-Anglo board routinely ignored. Students responded in December by leading a three-week boycott of the junior and senior high schools. The boycott began with demonstrations of hundreds of students in front of the high school, but spread to target Anglo-owned businesses that were known for their racist practices against Chicano employees and customers (see Navarro, 1995, ch. 4; Trujillo, 1998, ch. 3). A similar process played out in Houston in 1970. Although the student strike did not last as long, some 60% of students participated, a rate far greater than in Los Angeles or Crystal City (San Miguel, 2001).

Second, while students were central actors in school-based struggles for bilingual and bicultural education programs, they did not act alone. Alliances formed both across and between generations. That is, many of the organizations that were actively involved in school-based struggles included university students involved in Chicano and other radical organizations, such as United Mexican-American Students (now known as MEChA) in East Los Angeles, and the Mexican American Youth Organization (MAYO) in Texas. Particularly in the case of MAYO, these organizations served not only as conduits to extend experiences from one locale to the next, but also they acted as a structure to help internalize lessons learned through various types of organizing and to generalize these lessons across a layer of activists. These partnerships existed across generations, as well, in terms of parent organizations and other radical political organizations comprised largely of adults. In California, these organizations included the
Mexican American Political Association and the Brown Berets; in Texas, the Raza Unida Party, Ciudadanos Unidos and Las Familias Unidas (see Navarro, 1995; San Miguel 2001; Trujillo, 1998).

The aspect of these political partnerships most relevant here concerns their impact on bilingual and bicultural curricula. In Crystal City, Texas, for example, MAYO worked with Texans for the Educational Advancement of Mexican Americans to establish what were known as liberation schools during the school boycott. These liberation schools became the testing ground for a Chicano-centered, bilingual curriculum that would later be implemented as formal district policy. The boycotts themselves triggered the intervention of the U.S. Office of Education, which worked with parents (organized through Ciudadanos Unidos), MAYO, and faculty from Chicago State University and San Diego State University to train bilingual teachers and develop a new curriculum that incorporated Chicano history, literature, arts and bilingual education. The full curriculum was completed and approved by the school board on February 1, 1973 (Navarro, 1995). A similar story played out in Houston, where several organizations merged to form the Mexican American Education Council (MEAC). MEAC helped to organize a two-week boycott as the school year began in 1970, as well as to establish huelga (strike) schools, in which some 3,000 students participated (San Miguel, 2001).

Finally, these school-based struggles intersected with moves by policy makers at state and federal levels, and with moves made by education advocates to transform the educational experiences of Mexican American and other emergent bilingual students. For example, in 1965, the National Education Association conducted a study to assess the needs of Mexican American students in the Southwest. They held a conference in Tucson on October 30-31, 1966 to present and publicize the results. Earlier that year, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), created by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, held a conference in Albuquerque on discrimination against Mexican Americans. Chicano delegates walked out on the conference to protest lack of Mexican American representation on the EEOC board (Reveles, 1974). In a context of growing resistance across the Southwest to racism and segregation, these two events pressured officials in Washington to heed the demands Mexican Americans were making of schools, and of new anti-poverty and civil rights legislation.

These developments forced opened ideological and implementational space in the U.S. such that politicians felt pressure to codify them as formal policy. For example, in January 1967 Senator Ralph Yarborough of Texas sponsored the Bilingual Education Act. The bill received tepid support from Democrats and President Johnson (Reveles, 1974). Thus, to help ensure the bill’s passage, Yarborough tied it to reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965, rather than have it stand for a separate vote. In 1968, the measure was passed as Title VII of ESEA. Many discussions of the Bilingual Education Act rightly highlight the deficiencies of its original version, which neither required school authorities to provide for bilingual education nor defined what bilingual education entailed. Reauthorization of the act in 1974 provided such a definition, but it focused on transition from the home language to English, not on addition of English to the home language.

These widely known policy developments are often the sole focus of histories of bilingual education in the United States (most recently, for example, Gándara, et al., 2010). Specific policies, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Bilingual Education Act (BEA) of 1968, the Lau Remedies of 1974, etc. function as subjects in a narrative explaining the “early days” of bilingual education. Sometimes, a nod is made to the civil rights movements of the day.
However, little attention is paid to that connection in any detail. One consequence of this narrow perspective is that it distorts historical experience itself. The actions of Important People, such as President Johnson signing the Civil Rights Act or Senator Yarborough sponsoring the BEA, are framed as the central instigators of the fundamental social and educational changes that occurred in this era. To be sure, their actions did matter in terms of codifying important civil rights and language accommodations as formal policy; however, these individual moves would have been most unlikely absent the constellation of broad social forces imposing such changes from the ground up. A related consequence of this narrow perspective on history is that it misconstrues formal policy as itself agentive. To take an example, Gándara, et al. (2010) maintained: “The Civil Rights Act of 1964 ushered in a new era of rights for English learner students based on Title VI of that act…” (p. 24). The Civil Rights Act did nothing of the sort; civil rights movements, however, did. That is, it is real humans, whose activism and intentions forced opened social space to make the act possible, who account for a sea change in policy and practice regarding race, ethnicity, and, in this case, language accommodations. It is not a formal policy that alone opens or closes ideological and implementational space in society, even with the symbolic value that formal policy can have. Instead, it is what humans do – or don’t do – with that policy that holds the potential to effect change.

Indeed, the collective impact of what humans did during this era imposed radical changes on a number of fronts that exemplify the second part of the hypothesis that guides this paper. With respect to the Vietnam War, 1968 and 1969 marked horrific high points in U.S. aggression in Southeast Asia. But those years also represented a significant turning point in the movement to end the war. Not only did a majority of working class Americans register their opposition to the war for the first time in polls, but soldiers returning from Vietnam began to join, and at times lead, important anti-war organizations and events. As labor historian Sharon Smith (2006) noted, “By 1971, Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) was at the forefront of antiwar struggle at home” (p. 217). Chicano resistance to the war, moreover, was a key part of this deepening opposition. Given that almost 20% of soldiers killed during the war were Chicano (Acuña, 1981, p. 367), their resistance is not surprising. In 1969, activists organized a National Chicano Moratorium as part of the broader moratorium movement. They held another moratorium rally the next summer in Los Angeles, at which the police unleashed a barrage of violence, killing a 15-year old boy and a news reporter for a Spanish language television station. Both the size and strength of the rally and the degree of police violence deepened the already fast-growing resistance to the war (Allen, 2005, pp. 169-171). To be sure, U.S. defeat in Vietnam – brought about by a mass antiwar movement at home, open rebellion of U.S. troops against their officers, and Vietnamese resistance – did not end U.S. imperialism (Allen, 2005, p. 205). However, it represented a significant setback, popularly known as the Vietnam Syndrome, which prevented the United States from directly intervening and imposing its military power for the next decade. Equally important, this defeat taught a generation that collective resistance could stop even the mightiest military in the world.

In addition to the anti-Vietnam War movement and U.S. defeat in Southeast Asia, the U.S. working class mobilized its resources during this era. Part of these struggles represented the intersection of radical civil rights and labor movements, such as the Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement of African American autoworkers. At a much larger scale, however, the principal industrial unions at the time flexed their muscle, leading to a high point of strike activity in 1970. This included: a 67-day strike against General Motors; 40,000 coal miners striking to win
benefits for disabled miners; an illegal postal worker strike that shut down post offices in over 200 locales but resulted in a 14% pay raise; and a Teamsters strike led by the rank-and-file (Smith, 2006). Such labor struggles compounded significant economic challenges to U.S. imperialism at the time. By the early 1970s, Germany and Japan had emerged as serious economic competitors to the United States. Moreover, the decade was bookended by two worldwide recessions. Taken together, the post-war period of unprecedented economic expansion for the U.S. had come to an end, undermining the economic power of U.S. imperialism (Harman, 2003).

These anti-war and labor struggles both intersected with and impelled civil rights struggles such as the Chicano movement described above. Moreover, the gains that had been codified in federal civil rights, voting rights and anti-poverty legislation in 1964 and 1965 confirmed among activists that struggle begat success, thereby increasing expectations of what was possible (I. García, 1997; O. García, 2009; San Miguel, 2004). By understanding history in this way, we can reframe the Bilingual Education Act (BEA) not as the culmination of formal federal policy regarding language accommodations, but rather as an early effort to codify educational change imposed from the bottom up. Subsequent reauthorizations specified what the BEA meant by bilingual education, which was transition from the home language to English. By comparison, the Lau Remedies of 1974 were both an extension of this process of formal codification of change imposed from below, and a much stronger expression of students’ right to bilingual education. Interestingly, the advocates who helped the Lau family in their court case against San Francisco schools had their own activist roots in Asian American civil rights struggles in the Bay Area. These roots included developing political experience as student activists in the Third World Student Strike at San Francisco State College in 1968 (see Salamone, 2010). Finally, although not about bilingual education rights per se, we also can include the influential court case, Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School Children et al. v. Ann Arbor School District, as part of this trend. This case recognized non-standard varieties of English for the first time and required schools to make accommodations to bridge the gap between them and academic English.

None of these formal policies can be held up as perfect expressions of language rights or the aspirations for language maintenance that civil rights struggles espoused. Their shortcomings, however, are secondary to the social movements on the ground that made such policy possible in the first place. As such, this era exemplifies the second part of the hypothesis that guides this paper. If ascendant U.S. imperialism and a more systematically enforced national identity expressed in English only hang together in the period roughly from the Civil War to World War I, then we see an inverse parallel between the first significant defeat of U.S. imperialism and efforts of Chicano civil rights actors to pry open ideological and implementational space for the practice of and education in Spanish. In other words, the dynamic entanglement of imperial power exerted abroad and monolingual power imposed at home unraveled during this historic conjuncture. The expansion to which I refer is primarily at the level of specific communities and school, less so as formal language education policy. This is not meant to discard the important role that formal policy can play, but rather to reiterate my claim made earlier that formal policy is in fact subordinate to the collective actions that people engage in, not itself the motor of historical change. Indeed, such popular struggle faded over the course of the late 1970s and early 1980s as the primary arena for organizing shifted to Democratic electoral campaigns and away from social and labor movements and community organizing.
Coupled with the beginnings of an elite offensive to repulse the movements of that era, all the gains of the 60s and early 70s, including bilingual and bicultural education, came under attack. As a case in point: the Lau Remedies were never implemented as formal federal policy. Ronald Reagan’s assumption of office in 1981 not only continued the conservative restoration of U.S. power begun under Carter (see Smith, 2006, ch. 7). But also, it marked the first formal move to turn back the gains made in bilingual education practice across the United States.

The Resource Orientation Reprised

The previous section of this paper has explored the central hypothesis that guides this paper in two distinct historical contexts, namely Americanization and the rise of the U.S. imperialism, and the Chicano civil rights movement. As I have argued, these two cases help to substantiate my claim of an inverse relationship between expanding U.S. imperial power abroad and internal constriction of ideological and implementational space for emergent bilingual practice and education. To be sure, this general correlation merits further exploration on two fronts: at different eras in U.S. educational history and with different cases (e.g., Bale, under review); and in various international contexts, particularly those with similar colonial-settler histories. Nevertheless, if the basic tenets of my argument hold, then they suggest two primary implications for contemporary language education policy and advocacy.

The first is to re-consider the resource orientation in light of this framework. As argued above, if there exists in general an entanglement of the nation-state with monolingual practice and beliefs, then imperialism only tightens the knot. Thus, at issue is whether the resource orientation to language education advocacy and policy helps to slacken that knot, if not unravel it altogether. To address this issue is to concur with Ricento (2005) that the argument is not necessarily about the resource orientation itself, but rather how it is put to use; and with Ruiz (2010) that the resource orientation will mean different things to different people. What the contrast of the two histories I present above makes clear is that various definitions of the resource orientation do not operate as equal partners. Framing language as a resource in order to challenge oppression and exercise certain linguistic rights on the one hand, and framing language to meet the needs of elite economic and political interests on the other do not exist in ideological or practical equilibrium. Instead, they exist at best in tension, if not outright conflict with one another. In other words, the resource orientation is itself not neutral. Elite interpretations of the role that language and language education should (or should not) play in society over-determine the meaning of the language-as-resource orientation absent intentional efforts to impose a different interpretation. Consequently, strategies for language education advocacy that presuppose the need to tailor their message to conform to each of these competing interpretations of the resource orientation are self-defeating inasmuch as they reinforce interpretations of that orientation that already predominate. Indeed, this first conclusion confirms the overall argument in Petrovic (2005), despite the considerable difference in cases and the theoretical framework employed.

However, I believe it is precisely a Marxist understanding of imperialism and its implications for language practice that add even more clarity to an otherwise ambiguous debate about the resource orientation. If the general entanglement of ascendant U.S. imperialism with internal enforcement of monolingualism holds, then language education policies whose stated aims are to bolster imperialism will exacerbate that entanglement. In fact, the overwhelming majority of formal policies to support second language education in the U.S. have framed that
support in direct service of national defense and economic interests. Such policies include Title VI of the National Defense Education Act of 1958, continue with the National Security Education Act of 1991 and the National Security Language Initiative of 2006, and extend to the multitude of specific programs that each act has authorized and funded. The paradox is that these policies in general have failed on their own terms, that is, to expand capacity in the very languages they target. Even those language education scholars and practitioners most committed to expanding linguistic capacity in service of national interests concede this point; indeed, they often use this shortcoming as the primary rhetorical device to argue for a re-doubling of efforts (e.g., Brecht, 2007; Brecht & Rivers, 2000; Edwards, 2004; O’Connell & Norwood, 2007).

To be clear, this is not to say that such policies have had no positive impact whatsoever on language education and our broad understanding of it. As an historical example, it is undeniable that Title VI has made invaluable contributions to our understanding of second language acquisition, the development of specific pedagogical resources, and to the creation of a cadre of language experts (see Bale, 2008; O’Connell & Norwood, 2007). Yet, it would be intellectually dishonest to place these limited advances in the same category or on the same scale as the dramatic expansion in multilingual practice that social movements such as the Chicano civil rights imposed on U.S. society, and that policy makers were pressured into codifying as formal federal policy. My primary argument is that the inverse relationship between imperialism and language education and practice most accurately explains this difference in outcomes. In other words, it is precisely because this social movement, predicated in part on expanded language rights, intersected with and reinforced a series of movements that repulsed U.S. imperialism that social space for multilingualism expanded so dramatically and was codified as formal policy.

The second implication speaks to the terms on which language education scholars and practitioners should frame their advocacy. As argued above, elite interests tend to over-determine interpretations of the resource orientation. Particularly when such interests concern U.S. imperialism, they in fact work to constrict ideological and implementational space for emergent bilingual practice and education. This suggests that language education advocacy that considers itself pragmatic and politically realistic, to recall McGroarty (2006), should base itself on a twofold normative case. Not only should that advocacy be based on specific language rights of emergent bilingual populations; but also, as the historical case of the Chicano civil rights movement indicates, that advocacy should connect the case for language rights with other social movements challenging U.S. imperialism.

Neither facet of this second conclusion is alone novel. Using them to rethink what in fact is pragmatic, however, is. That is, there is no sense in developing a rights-based case for language education if we check that case at the door when engaging with formal policy makers, or otherwise subordinate that case to other ostensibly more expedient rationales. As argued above, multiple interpretations of the resource orientation do not exist in some sort of ideological or practical equilibrium. If an interpretation of the resource orientation in terms of language rights is to be successful, it requires challenging, not accommodating, elite interpretations, including those interpretations grounded in U.S. imperialism. The power of historical precedent, namely the Chicano civil rights movements, suggests that this is in fact the pragmatic approach to language education advocacy.
References


**Author**

JEFF BALE is Assistant Professor of Second Language Education at Michigan State University.
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