



Wylie, P. (2018). The All-Administrative Campus: University of British Columbia, Okanagan. *Workplace*, 31, 10-21.

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THE ALL-ADMINISTRATIVE CAMPUS: UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, OKANAGAN

Introduction

The Government of British Columbia (BC) established many new public universities in the province, 2005-10, largely out of existing colleges and university colleges. In the case of University of British Columbia, Okanagan (UBCO) an existing institution, Okanagan University College (OUC), was in 2005 split into two new entities, UBCO and Okanagan College (OC), with The University of British Columbia (UBC) taking over the university campus and functions of the former OUC, to form UBCO. The two new institutions (or rather one new institution, OC, and one new campus of an existing institution, UBCO) were to henceforth to exist separately; UBCO with a research-intensive academic discipline mandate, and national/international focus, and the new college, OC, with a largely vocational and trades applied college mandate, and a local/regional focus. The *BC University Act* (latest revision, 2017) was amended to allow for UBCO as a new provincial research-oriented university campus.

The focus of the paper is on internal governance and management at UBCO as it has evolved since 2005, in particular with respect to traditions of shared academic governance in university management. The paper is informed by the analysis of Ginsberg (2011), and is divided into four sections. The first discusses the insights of Ginsberg and how they can be applied in this case. The second discusses general issues of consultation, communication and commitment to shared academic governance by the senior administrators of the new campus. Third, budgetary management, accountability and transparency is discussed. Finally, strategic academic planning is analyzed, along with academic program review and performance. The paper ends with some concluding comments. To anticipate the results of the analysis, the paper tends to confirm the words attributed to Professor Henry Rosovsky, economic historian and past Acting President of Harvard University, that the quality of a university campus is likely “negatively correlated with the unrestrained power of administrators” (Ginsberg, 2011, p. 3). On this slope of correlation, UBCO is not an outlier.

Theoretical and Empirical Perspective

Ginsberg (2011) offers an influential analysis of how the management of the modern university in recent decades has been taken over and corporatized by their senior professional administration staff and taken out of the control of regular faculty, staff and students (formerly known as “the university”). He refers to it as the rise of the “all-administrative” university, and the fall of the faculty. The concept of “administrative bloat” is another relevant concept in the literature (Mirzadeh, 2015; Carlson, 2014). The primary indicators Ginsberg uses to index this rise of the professional management cadre and the fall of the faculty on the contemporary North American campus are the increasing ratios of total staff, especially managerial and professional (M&P) staff, to the number of students, and the declining ratios of total faculty, especially long-term faculty, to the number of students. Figures 1 and 2 below are calculations of these “Ginsberg” ratios for UBCO, the new campus of UBC as of 2005, over the period 2006-07 to 2016-17. With all data in “Full-Time Equivalents” (FTEs), Figure 1 depicts the ratios of M&P staff to students, total

staff to students, and total faculty to students. Figure 2 depicts the ratios of total staff to faculty and of M&P staff to faculty.

Since 2006-07, the ratio of M&P staff to students at UBCO has risen by 25% and the ratio of total staff to students by 7%. The increase in these ratios is particularly pronounced since 2010-11, rising 24% and 21% respectively to 2016-17. These findings for UBCO are much in line for what Ginsberg (2011) finds for United States colleges and universities. Since 2006-07, the ratio of total faculty to students at UBCO has fallen by 27%. The decline in this ratio is particularly pronounced 2006-07 to 2011-12, falling 26% in that period and then somewhat stabilizing. These findings for UBCO are also much in line for what Ginsberg (2011) finds for United States colleges and universities. The ratio of M&P staff to faculty at UBCO has hence risen a staggering 72% 2006-07 to 2016-17, the ratio of total staff to faculty, by an almost as impressive 47%. The increases in these ratios hence render UBCO an excellent example and pertinent case study of the rise of the all-administrative university, administrative bloat, and the fall of the faculty. Ginsberg finds an average and rising ratio of management and staff per 100 students of about 8 for US public colleges and universities; the ratio for UBCO is around a similar 7 by 2016-17 (see Figure 1).

Another ratio of interest (not depicted) is that of full-time faculty and staff to M&P staff – see Hechinger (2012) where the focus is on this ratio. This article finds that for United States public universities, this ratio declined from 3.5 to 2.2 over the 2001-2011 period, demonstrating the rise of the M&P cadre relative to faculty and regular staff. For UBCO, this ratio declined from 4.4 in 2006-07 to in 3.3 in 2016-17, showing a similar relative rise of the M&P class. For a particularly stark example at UBCO, in its Faculty of Management in 2017-18, full-time staff members in the Faculty are listed as 15, along with 3 deans/directors, supporting only 10 full-time faculty members, only 7 of whom are “permanent” tenured or tenure-track. In that Faculty’s Bachelor of Management (BMGT) program in the same year, 2017-18, the 3 deans/directors did no teaching, and 80 percent of all courses were taught by non-research, non-permanent, non-tenured and non-tenure-track, temporary and sessional faculty.




Figure 1: “Ginsberg” ratios for UBC Okanagan, 2006-07 to 2016-17. Source: UBC Office of Planning and Institutional Research (PAIR). “Faculty” includes long-term faculty, short-term faculty, deans and associate deans, and other related academic staff e.g. librarians. All in Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs). “Staff” includes managerial and professional (M&P) staff, clerical, service and technical/trade staff, and other staff. Also all in FTEs. Students are FTE domestic and international students, inclusive of undergraduate and graduate.




Figure 2: “Ginsberg” ratios for UBC Okanagan, 2006-07 to 2016-17. Source: As for Figure 1. For definitions see Figure 1.

Data that demonstrate the growing “administrative bloat” of the UBCO campus since its establishment include the number of senior administrators on salaries in excess of \$150,000, a salary level that only a small minority of faculty at UBCO can aspire to. In 2007-08, these numbered only 7, in support of 4216 total FTE students and 314 total FTE faculty. By 2016-17, this number had grown to 37, supporting 7805 total FTE students and 436 total FTE faculty. So this cadre has risen over fivefold while students have less than doubled and faculty has risen by less than 40 percent. Of these 37 highly-paid senior administrators in 2016-17, 32 were academic administrators – former professors who having been seconded to senior administrative positions and now did little or no teaching - and 5 were non-academic administrators, such as finance and HR professionals. Moreover, below this top level of administration there is a growing army of positions at lower ranks but still in the \$75,000-\$150,000 per year salary range, reflecting not only the mushrooming of new more junior positions under the new senior administrator ones (associate and assistant deans, associate provosts and the like) as well as the well-documented job classification creep inherent in the repositioning of jobs in higher and higher job classification ranks.

Academic Governance at UBCO

Now, looking beyond the numbers to where the power actually lies, consider the relative roles of the senior administrators and the faculty members, staff and students in the academic governance of the campus. On establishment of UBCO in 2005, it was decided that UBC, for now both of its campuses in Vancouver and the Okanagan, would have a bicameral (Board and Senate) structure but a single Board of Governors suitably expanded to now include Okanagan campus representation (one elected faculty member, one elected staff member and one elected student from the UBCO campus), a single President, and a single Chancellor. It was also decided that the two campuses would have their own separate Senates under *the University Act* section 37.1 that “The academic governance of the University is vested in the Senate” (*University Act*, 2017, p. 34). Hence the responsibility for the academic governance and integrity of the Okanagan campus, including admissions of students, was vested in the Okanagan Senate, and of the Vancouver campus, in the Vancouver Senate. Both Senates were to comprise of elected representation from faculty and students (and alumni, but no elected staff members) and of course large *ex officio* representation from senior administration.

There has been failure of the shared governance norm at the new UBCO campus. Unfortunately the UBCO Senate has proved to be an entirely toothless institution in the all-administrative campus; it has never developed to be the primary institution for academic governance on the campus, in violation of the *University Act*. Instead, that role has become the preserve of the senior administration alone, without Senate input. Senate minutes and decisions are published, but the campus is actually run in all matters including all academic matters, including admission of students, by a “Leadership Team” and “Strategic Enrolment Management Committee” for which no minutes of

meetings are ever published, and with no independently elected faculty, staff or student representation, nor union or faculty association representation; only senior administrators.

Rather than discuss this issue in all of its manifest examples, one excellent recent example was the development by UBCO senior administration (actually the brainchild of the Dean of the Faculty of Management) of something called *Interprise*. In late September 2016 there appeared published on the UBCO website what appeared to be a new summer academic program, *Interprise*, and associated brochure. Senate had not been consulted in any way before this new program was published, in spite of it being the jurisdiction of Senate to "consider, approve and recommend to the board the revision of courses of study, instruction and education in all faculties and departments of the university" (University Act, 2017, p. 35). The program consisted of seven upper-level (third and fourth year) courses, twenty-one credits, and a significant student overload in summer session – Senate regulations generally allow students to take a maximum of 14-15 credits in one four-month summer session. All of the courses existed in their current Senate-approved format except for a three-credit capstone course. The various upper-level courses had various lower-level (first and second year) course prerequisites, but these were proposed to be waived for any student accepted into the program, and almost all of the courses were proposed to be taught in two weeks each rather than in the standard Senate-approved six-week summer term norm of three-credit courses in the summer. Posters and leaflets appeared around campus advertising the program.

From late September and into November 2016, after I, acting as an elected Senator (representative of the joint Faculties), raised concerns with the Senate Secretariat, various clandestine revisions to the program website and brochure appeared over the course of a few weeks. Two of the seven courses were removed and replaced with two different courses, the word “program” was removed from the website and brochure, and the three-credit capstone course that did not exist as a Senate-approved course was removed and the program reduced to eighteen credits. All in all, at least a dozen major and minor revisions were made, behind the scenes. Students had not been consulted in any way on *Interprise*; the students elected to Senate also raised concerns. So the questions were, among others: How was it possible to make up new academic programming at UBCO and not have it go through the proper Senate channels for approval, given that Senate is the governance body for all academic affairs on the campus? Could *Interprise* give a general waiver to Senate-approved lower-level prerequisites for upper-level courses without seeking Senate approval? Was Senate approval required for *Interprise* to have a built-in student course overload? The fact that students were being asked to take an overload of courses and also to take courses without having the prerequisites for the courses; would this create stress and anxiety for students? Should a student run into academic, emotional or other problems with *Interprise* and bring action against the University, was the University setting itself up for liability if it offered *Interprise* but had not carried out due diligence and process having had it first approved by Senate? Was Senate approval required for a program to use entirely different term and examination schedules to the Senate-approved ones?

For these reasons I brought a motion for Senate’s consideration and determination in March 2017: That the Senate direct that *Interprise* be submitted for due and diligent approval of academic programming through the established channels of collegial and shared academic governance via Senate; and that its proponents undertake the necessary consultations, departmental approvals for inclusion of courses in the initiative, Departmental and/or Faculty Curriculum Committee approvals, Senate Curriculum Committee approval, and finally Senate approval, in advance of its first potential offering. This motion failed at Senate; the students on Senate all voted for the motion, the senior administrators and almost all of the faculty members (presumably not wanting to vote in opposition to the senior administrators, who determine their salaries?) against. So the following question at UBCO was answered by the Senate vote (albeit by a very slim majority of 13-11): Where does *de facto* jurisdiction reside with the academic governance and standards of the campus; in the departments, Faculties and Senate, the latter made up as it is by faculty, students, alumni and administrators, or with the senior executive administration? Or is it a both a *de jure* and *de facto* “shared governance”? The answer: It lies *de facto* with the senior executive administration, in the Deans’ and Provost’s offices. It is the executive administration that owns the courses and curriculum to do with them as they wish; ownership does not lie with the departments, Faculties and Senate that approved these courses and curriculum with their prerequisites and specific delivery format, and course descriptions. So it is in the all-administrative university such as UBCO. Hence *Interprise* appears in the latest UBC Undergraduate Viewbook (2018, p. 15) as “[one] of the University’s groundbreaking options” among programs of study. I use just this one example, there are many others, but for reasons of space I will restrict the discussion to just this one instance.

Now consider other aspects of shared academic governance at UBCO. On establishment in 2005, five Faculties, one School, and one College were created within UBCO; the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, The Faculty of Creative and Critical Studies, the Faculty of Management, the Faculty of Education, the Faculty of Health and Human Services

(later to be known as the Faculty of Health and Social Development), the School of Engineering (not its own Faculty but under the administration of the Faculty of Applied Science in Vancouver), and the College of Graduate Studies. A Dean was appointed to lead each Faculty and College; the School of Engineering only an Associate Dean, under the Dean of the Faculty of Applied Science at UBC Vancouver. Each Faculty was provided, with, under the *BC University Act* section 40 “the powers and duties to make rules for the government, direction and management of the Faculty and its affairs and business” (University Act, 2017, p. 39), with the primary mechanism for this the Faculty Councils, established by each Faculty.

The Faculty Councils at UBCO, like Senate, have also proven to be entirely toothless institutions in the all-administrative university campus, the Faculties tend to be run by the senior administrators. For example the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, by far the largest Faculty, is run as an autocracy or oligarchy by the Dean’s Office. There has been a total lack of transparency, accountability or democracy in the way the Faculty has been run since 2005. The Faculty Council only looks at curriculum, and has no input into budgetary allocation matters, or matters of academic and strategic planning, and the minutes of the meetings of the “Leadership Team” that runs the Faculty (the Deans, Associate Deans and Heads) are not even made publicly available to Faculty Council or to faculty members, staff or students. All budgetary matters and executive decision-making are hence held entirely out of the purview of the Faculty Council and the regular faculty and staff members, and students, in a totally non-transparent and unaccountable manner. A strategic academic plan for the Faculty was finally, after 12 years, produced in 2017, but there was no serious attempt to engage either Faculty Council or faculty, staff and students in its development, and the document was drafted entirely by the Dean’s Office and was, as Ginsberg has classified many a university strategic plan, a largely vacuous “vision for excellence” (Ginsberg, 2011 p. 48). Few matters of Faculty governance, management and direction are brought by the Dean’s Office to the Faculty Council for decision-making other than curriculum matters; all other matters are largely for information only, or for expedited rubber-stamping. The Councils of the other Faculties, Schools and Colleges are I am told much the same, given the corporate all-administrative culture of the campus.

Moreover, in the large majority of university campuses around the world, under each Faculty there are somewhat autonomous academic disciplinary departments, each with a chair or head, to run each department. This notion was an early casualty at UBCO. A UBC Vancouver Senate motion of 1994 was dusted off to determine that no department at UBCO could be less than 15 faculty members (UBC Vancouver Senate Minutes, 1994). Why a Vancouver Senate motion was relevant to UBCO, which has its own Senate, was not made clear. This has proven to be not without its problems over the last 12 years or so. The Faculties of Education and Management were too small even as Faculties to have even one department, so they evolved as “departmentless” Faculties. Because of this, and the fact that UBC appointment policies for heads/directors only applied to departments and schools, in these Faculties director/heads were appointed by senior administrators (Deans and above) without input from faculty members, staff or students. Nor have regular faculty members been allowed to apply for or nominate themselves to these positions or nominate others. Appointments have even been made by the senior administrators in one of the Faculties, the Faculty of Management, of faculty members from outside of the Faculty itself (and even outside of the campus) to take on these roles. Faculty members in the two “departmentless” faculties have been told by UBCO senior administration (and, strangely the faculty union,) that it is just fine that the persons who determine their workload, recommend their pay rises, chair their reappointment, tenure and promotion processes, write “Head’s letters” for recommending their tenure, promotion or otherwise, and even lead their curriculum processes, can be appointed without their input and without any consultative and open application and nomination process, and that these persons can even come from outside of their own Faculty. This, they have been told, is because they were unfortunate enough to find themselves in “departmentless” Faculties, something perhaps akin to being homeless waifs, unfortunately finding themselves in Faculties that do not have to follow the normal shared governance norms of appointments to such positions, of accountability, responsibility and authority.

Another major problem was created in 2004 and early 2005 when the new Faculties were established. Fine and creative arts was proposed as a Faculty encompassing the existing visual arts curriculum of the former university college, OUC, as well as the development of new programs in music, theatre and film, and a Faculty of Arts and Sciences was proposed along the lines of a \$15m endowment given for that purpose (\$10m from BC forestry magnate and generous benefactor of UBC, Irving K. Barber, and \$5m from UBC itself). However, largely due to the personalities and aspirations of the two new proposed deans at the time for these two Faculties, both the very large English department (all degree students at UBCO have to take first-year English courses) and the modern languages departments (French, Spanish, German, Japanese – all BA students at UBCO must demonstrate a proficiency in a second language) lobbied to move to the proposed creative arts Faculty. Thus the Arts were split between two Faculties and the Faculty of Arts and Science evolved to encompass only a subset of the arts and humanities, “missing

the largest department, English. The new Faculty of Critical and Creative Studies (as it was named) also later developed new programs in art history, creative writing and cultural studies. So an early senior administrative mistake, based on the desires of the two deans at the time, was made in splitting the arts between two Faculties. This undermined the purpose of the \$15m endowment (“to create an undergraduate arts and sciences education in the finest tradition”) and hence also the goals of the new university campus.

The Faculty of Arts and Sciences came to be organized as six interdisciplinary “units” (faculty members objected to calling them departments, as they amalgamated various disparate disciplines, such as Psychology and Computer Science). Each had to meeting the arbitrary UBC Vancouver Senate requirement of at least 15 faculty members by hook or by crook, and was assigned a single head. These have now evolved into eight single-disciplinary and interdisciplinary “departments” as original faculty member objections to becoming a “department” with disparate disciplines eventually subsided through sheer administrative attrition. Some of these departments, solely to make up the 15 number, of course make little academic sense, such as the Department of History and Sociology. The Faculty of Critical and Creative Studies evolved into being composed of two large, interdisciplinary “departments”, one of Critical Studies (The disciplines of English, cultural studies and modern languages) and the second of Creative Studies (the disciplines of visual and performing arts, creative writing, and art history).

Over the years the original administrative fiat mistake was slowly acknowledged so there was a recent largely administrative-led attempt to amalgamate the two Faculties. The Provost and Principal in 2015 supported an initiative to explore a merger of the Faculty of Creative and Critical Studies and the Faculty of Arts and Sciences into one larger all-encompassing Faculty of Arts and Sciences, including all of the Arts, instead of having the Arts split between the two Faculties. This would have corrected the original mistake. The administration however ran afoul of the requirements of the BC *University Act* that, under the shared governance norms of university management, invests power in the legislative Faculty Councils to make important decisions regarding their Faculties (e.g. whether they should disappear or not), not in the executive senior administration. It was found that Humpty Dumpty couldn’t be put back together again; the two Faculties had evolved independently over the previous twelve years and a proposal to take forward for further development the idea of a merger was heavily defeated in both Faculty Councils. It proved impossible to get the Faculty of Creative and Critical Studies to abolish itself once established, and the proposal was also defeated by the Council of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, largely by the votes of the sciences faculty who feared a dilution of their majority in the Faculty. So, this proved that even at UBCO, there are limits to the reach of the all-administrative university, and that the fall of the faculty is not yet entirely complete.

Another problem has been manifest in the Faculty of Education, which was recklessly expanded in faculty numbers under one senior administration team of Principal and Provost(s), only to be then downsized and curtailed by their successors, to the extent that it will now cease to be an independent Faculty of UBCO but will instead be transferred to be administered by the Faculty of Education on the Vancouver campus. The number of FTE faculty members in the Faculty doubled from 15 in 2006 to 30 in 2014, and since then has declined to 21. The senior UBCO administration over the last few years has felt it had the unilateral authority to tell the Faculty, and without consultation with Senate, that it could no longer remain as its own independent Faculty. The preference expressed by the faculty members to be acquired by Vancouver is only after they were told by senior administration that they could not remain as their own Faculty; a *fait accompli* of academic governance entirely engineered by senior administration. This is I suppose to be expected at an all-administrative institution with a rubber-stamp Senate. Senate is *de jure* but obviously not *de facto* the body with the power under the *University Act* “to recommend...the establishment or discontinuance of any Faculty” (University Act, 2017, p. 35). However, it was increasingly apparent, since January 2014 and the resignation of the then Dean, and the non-appointment of a new Dean since then by the administration, that the Faculty was not going to continue as a Faculty. Senate was not consulted or asked for its opinion on the discontinuation of the Faculty, nor had students in any way been consulted about it, until it was a done administrative deal.. In the all-administrative university, it is not seek consent first, then act; it is rather, act first, and seek rubber stamp consent after. UBCO Senate gave its rubber-stamp approval in April, 2018. Perhaps there is some hope. The newly-appointed President of UBC said in July 2016:

We will become a stronger and better university if our most outstanding faculty take ownership of our academic standards and academic governance.... I will work with the Board of Governors, Senates, central administration, deans, heads and directors and faculty members at large to continuously improve UBC’s governance, guided by principles of transparency, openness and accountability. It is critical that the faculty have reason to trust, respect and view as competent the people in leadership roles at the university. (Ono, S, 2016)

Budgetary Management Priorities at UBCO

Now consider the budgetary revenues and expenditures, operating and capital, of the new university campus, as additional aspects of the all-administrative university campus subject to administrative bloat. On announcing the new campus, the Government committed \$80m in capital funding plus access to BC Capital Development funds, as well as \$10m in “start-up” operational funding “in advance of the arrival of the additional students.” (MoU, 2004, p. 6). As regular funding on the operations side, the Government committed to funding the operational requirements of teaching the existing 3,000 students staying on to complete their degrees from the former OUC, at \$21m (as OUC teaching this number of students in 2004-05 was so funded, at around \$7,000 per student) and \$45m in addition (around \$10,000 per FTE new student) for the operational requirements of accommodating the 4,500 additional students targeted for UBCO by 2009-10, reaching an operational government grant funding total (exclusive of tuition fees) of \$66m by that date (MoU, 2004, p. 6). UBCO was funded by the government at a much higher level for its new undergraduate degree students than the existing OUC had been so funded, presumably in order to cover the expected higher salaries for UBC faculty than for OUC faculty at the time, and to allow for the research mandate of the new campus in contrast to the predominantly teaching mandate of OUC. It turned out subsequently however that UBCO faculty were not to be paid at the level of their UBC Vancouver campus counterparts. Since 2005, about \$450m has been invested in new capital (mainly new buildings), and total operating funds (government grants plus domestic and international student tuition fees) have grown to around \$125m per year in 2016-17 (see Figure 3).




Figure 3: Operating Revenues/Income UBCO, \$m 2005-06-to 2017-18 (2017-18 are estimates). Source: UBC Budget Statements, various years.

A word of caution regarding UBC budgetary reporting is in order; it is a model of opacity, obfuscation and lack of transparency and accountability. Over time since 2005, less and less information has been given in the presentations to governing bodies such as Senate, as the University plumbs lower and lower depths of opacity and unaccountability. The presentation to Senate of the 2017-18 budget is a good example (UBC Okanagan Senate, 2017). It is hard to decipher from any of the publicly presented documents as to what is going on with the budget. One point is clear once one sorts through the forest and thickets of information designed to confuse and obfuscate: The University on its UBCO campus has consistently underspent its revenue on operations, and diverted large operating surpluses to capital project funding. Figure 3 depicts the revenue sources for the campus; the \$10,000 per target FTE student grant from the government (this was a generous amount; the other new universities established 2005-10 tended to be funded via government grant at only around \$7,000 per FTE domestic student), the tuition fees recouped from domestic Canadian students (about \$500 per course, \$5,000 per year for a full-time ten-course-load

student), the tuition fees recouped from international students (about \$3,500 per course, \$35,000 per year for a full-time ten-course-load student – by far the highest international student tuition fees in the Province), and other minor revenues (e.g. parking fees and fines). The government grant grew over time to 2009-10 in line with the domestic student enrolment targets, and like those targets since then has been fixed. Domestic and international student fees have grown continuously in line with courses taken and paid for by registered students per year and with domestic and international student fee increases. Operating revenues per registered student rose sharply as funding was increased must faster than student enrolment, 2005-06 to 2009-10, then fell as enrolment caught up with funding 2009-10 to 2012-13. It began to rise again after 2012-13 as international student fee revenue rose sharply (due to both more international students, and higher fees per student). All in all, funding per student to the campus has been and is extremely ample and generous.

The major difficulty in deciphering the budget is not on the revenue side but on the expenditure side, since the budget publicly presented is a statement of spending goals only but is unaudited with respect to actual expenditure. Basically, it is publicly unclear where, when, why, how or if any or all of the revenues are actually spent, and on what and whom. All revenues until 2014-15 were held by the central senior administration, for unaudited expenditures as the administrators saw fit, with no transparency or accountability as to actual expenditure. The large excess of revenues over expenditures in the University's General Purpose Operating Funds over the last decade or so has been UBC-wide, but was especially true at UBCO, which has had an uninterrupted history of large operating budget surpluses. The UBCO campus took around eight years to meet its funded student targets, but was able in the interim to use government grant revenue in an unrestricted fashion, revenue based on expected (but not actual) faculty salary costs, and targeted numbers rather than actual numbers of enrolled students. This grant revenue was not cut because of the shortfall in enrolled students or because of lower than expected faculty salary costs, so UBCO was able to transfer large operating surpluses to capital projects and administrative bloat. The campus was being funded at a very generous level for more students than it was teaching, and for higher faculty salary costs than it was experiencing (due to both lower pay for UBCO faculty than faculty in Vancouver, and persistent UBCO faculty hiring shortfalls) and was hence able to add this generous surplus funding to additional start-up capital funding and administrative bloat. Grant and tuition revenue was unrestricted as to what it could be actually spent on; basically it could be spent for any purpose, including capital projects, consistent with the overall mission of the University, and it tended to be spent on capital projects and senior administrative and staff positions, not on faculty and students, as demonstrated by the 'Ginsberg' ratios of Figures 1 and 2, and the fact already noted that in 2007-08, there were only 7 senior administrators with salaries in excess of \$150,000 (an expenditure of around \$1.25m, excluding benefits such as pension) but by 2016-17 there were 37, at an expenditure of over \$7m (excluding benefits). Much of the incremental increases in revenue to the campus (all via tuition fees in recent years, especially for international students) appears to have gone to the increasing cadre of senior administrators and their offices increasingly padded with more and more junior administrative positions.

The most direct evidence for this, once one cuts through the thickets of misinformation, are the budget presentations of 2010-11 and 2011-12. For 2011-12, UBCO is described as having a "structurally balanced" operating budget. However it is clear in the document that there was an at least \$15m surplus. This was not described as a surplus, but in a newspeak fashion as a "structurally balanced budget with a fiscal operating contingency." The surplus funds were transferred to capital projects due to what is described as a "fundraising deficit on major capital projects." At UBC funding for capital projects comes from Federal and Provincial funding, donations or "internally financed." UBCO has been able to use its "internal bank", moving working capital, i.e. faculty and departmental operating revenue for teaching students, to long-term capital projects. Moreover, the operating budgets of the Faculties and central supply units already contain a wide variety of capital expenditures (anything under \$2.5m).

A careful and informed reading of UBCO budget statements gives some additional information, entirely unclear in the published figures. The UBC Budget Statement for 2009-10 for UBCO notes newspeakingly the "budget includes a contingency of \$3.3m plus unallocated budget of \$4.7m...further contingency allocation [is] expected including capital contingency." The 2010-11 UBCO budget presentation notes that "fundraising targets were not met for completed capital projects; additional debt servicing funding through operating funds." The 2013-14 statement for UBCO notes \$7.8m in "one-time funding from the 2012-13 contingency (\$3.5m) and recovery of projected unit surpluses." The 2014-15 budget notes a \$7m operating surplus. The 2016-17 budget summary notes: "operating expenditures includes ongoing capital costs and internal loans for capital projects," also that "the deficits being budgeted for the Okanagan Faculties, in the current year, represent the use of operating surpluses set aside for capital projects." Even more opaquely and newspeakingly it is stated: "When UBC acquires tangible assets, the spending appears as a surplus in the statement of operations in the year of acquisition (although the cash is spent)." I take this to mean in plain non-newspeak English: The surplus on operations is spent on acquiring tangible capital assets. So it

is clear UBCO has not been spending all of its generous grant and tuition revenue on teaching students and paying faculty salaries since 2005 to date, but has spent a large percentage of it on building buildings, as well as increasing the cadre of administrators.

The original Memorandum of Understanding (MoU, 2004) between the BC government and UBC on the founding of UBCO had no provision for UBCO to adequately fund Faculties and departments and no targets for faculty hiring and class sizes, just targets on student enrolment. Hence, class sizes and student-to-faculty ratios have expanded to be very large, in contradiction of the founding vision of the university campus, which was to be for a high quality of undergraduate education with small class sizes and an intimate learning environment for students. The healthy and wealthy surplus on the operating budget has also expanded to be very large, to be expended in building buildings and padding the administrative managerial and professional class. For example, the Okanagan campus *Viewbook* for 2008 noted that: “Class sizes are kept deliberately small and taught by highly-skilled professors” (UBC Viewbook, 2008, p. 2). This has not in fact been the case; class sizes have grown to be the largest of any university or college campus in BC, and the University is building a new 400-seat lecture theatre at UBCO to accommodate them, financed by the Federal and Provincial governments and future UBCO students via a special 20-year levy, and at no cost to the University, to add to the two existing 300-seat theatres, plus other large classrooms. One might have expected more accountability with the Government as to the use of its generous taxpayer-paid funding to UBCO.

Moreover, until quite recently (2014-15) all budget at UBCO was held centrally, and distributed to the academic programs, departments and Faculties at the whim of the Principal and Provost. A new budgetary mechanism was installed in 2014-15 that devolves a major portion of government grant and tuition revenues to the Faculty where the courses and programs the students are enrolled in are housed. This is unlike at UBC Vancouver, where the budget devolves down to the specific departments teaching the courses and programs, e.g. economics or philosophy. So the UBCO mechanism fails to empower the individual academic departments and programs with direct funding, another example of the all-administrative university campus, even in comparison to UBC Vancouver. This mechanism obviously works well for the “departmentless” Faculties such as the Faculty of Education and the Faculty of Management, and probably for the School of Engineering, but not for departments and schools in the other Faculties, the latter who continue to be provided their funding only at the whim of their Faculty Dean’s Office.

Strategic Academic Planning and Program Review at UBCO

Considered now is academic planning, or rather the lack of it at the new UBCO campus, something highlighted by an external development review of the campus undertaken by the then UBC President in 2011 (Development Review, 2011). The campus, after failing to meet its initial enrolment target in 2005-06, was in a race to catch-up to the growing enrolment targets 2006-13 (to a final target of 7,500 students by 2009-10) and was happy to admit students from anywhere and into any program that could be expanded fast enough to accommodate them. This left academic planning as a free-for-all with those programs most focussed on expansion being the ones expanded the most. For example, domestic student new-to-UBC admissions reached very high levels in 2011-12, focused mainly on the Bachelor of Arts program, which was relatively easy to expand, and which was twice as large as any other program by 2011-12..

The campus did produce “strategic academic plans” in both 2005 and 2010, but of course both were classic “visions for excellence” affairs (Ginsberg, 2011, p.48) entirely devoid of any actual academic planning. The catchwords of the 2005 plan were “excellence in all things at all times” and “intimate learning community” (UBC Okanagan, 2005) but of course with no concrete plans to make any of this happen, assuming perhaps that it would all happen simply by osmosis. The 2010 plan was put together by a committee of 23 members hand-picked by the then Provost (UBC Okanagan, 2010). Some major academic units (such as the one I was head of at the time, encompassing 14 percent of all student registrations on the campus and 11 percent of all faculty members) has no representative on it at all. The overall plan died just months after publication; in fact, it was only ever published as a draft, and never made it to the light of day as the finished article. Despite it being by far the largest Faculty on campus, the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, and it having both an Associate Dean of Strategic Planning and another Associate Dean of Academic Planning, both in office since 2005, no strategic or academic plan for that Faculty was ever produced during the lifetime of those offices to 2016. These two Associate Dean portfolios were rearranged in 2016 by the new Dean when the Faculty went from three Associate Deans to four, and the new Dean’s Office finally drafted a strategic academic plan for the faculty in 2017, but without any meaningful input from faculty, staff or students, and without any meaningful content as to actual academic planning.

New professional and vocation programs at UBCO have developed and expanded uninhibited in Engineering (Bachelor of Applied Science, BASC), Bachelor of Human Kinetics (BHK) and Bachelor of Management (BMGT),

to add to the existing Bachelor of Education (BED) and Bachelor of Science in Nursing (BSN) programs (however the Bachelor of Social Work (BSW) was discontinued in 2012-13). This has changed the make-up of the campus away from an initial emphasis on the liberal arts and sciences. The Development Review of 2011 noted “an absence of substantive and viable academic planning” on the campus and, “as a consequence of the pressures to grow enrolment in a short time frame, the lack of coordinated enrolment management” (Development Review, 2011 ps. 7, 11). The Review called for academic planning with respect to the number and size of faculties and departments, strategic enrolment management at the campus level, the need for greater engagement across UBCO faculty, staff and students in campus in academic and strategic planning processes, and external reviews of all academic programs, none of which had been undertaken to that time. A document produced by UBCO in 2013 to attain academic accreditation with the Association of University and Colleges in Canada (AUCC) promised that: “A review of the academic growth and program priorities for the Okanagan campus is being undertaken over the coming year.” (UBC Okanagan 2013 p. 11). No such review ever appeared, at least publicly.

Enrolment in the BA program at the Vancouver campus had not fallen over the last number of years at all, but at the UBCO campus it had fallen by around 40 percent. This has been deliberate on the part of the UBCO senior administration, and without consultation with Senate, faculty, staff or students in the all-administrative campus. New domestic student admissions to UBCO reached very high levels in 2011-12, focused mainly on the BA program. The UBCO Registrar is quoted as saying in late 2012: “Because UBCO [was] now at its target enrolment, any increase to enrolment on one program requires a decrease in enrolment in another program...[we] need to manage domestic students to ministry levels, any more than that we are losing money” (Faculty of Arts and Sciences Council Minutes, 2012). So after domestic student enrolment targets were reached in 2012-13, the attention of the senior administration was to downsize some now deemed over-expanded programs (the liberal arts e.g. BA) to allow room for continued growth in the other science and professional programs that were now a higher administrative, if not academic (there was no academic consultation e.g. at Senate), priority (e.g. the BSc, BASC, BHK, and BMGT). Since 2012-13, the downsizing of the liberal arts and the continued growth of the science and professional programs has then been a deliberate administrative plan, but with no consultation with faculty, staff and students, nor indeed, Senate.

To take one arts discipline for example, History, there were fewer students taking a history course at the campus in 2016 than there were in 2005, despite an almost tripling of the number of students on campus. There were also 30 percent fewer history courses being offered in 2016 than in 2005. Similar observations can be made of modern and ancient languages, both regarding courses and students, and for the combined disciplines of economics, history, philosophy, political science and sociology, there are fewer sections of courses offered in 2016 than in 2005 or 2006. This is of concern in light of a statement such as the following (Moore, 2016, 45): “The liberal arts produce public goods. They produced the civil rights movement, feminism and marriage equality. We should not be so foolish to pretend that any of the social and political progress we have made as humans would have been possible without the arguments that are first debated and tested in liberal arts classrooms.” So the focus of UBCO has away from the BA. Minimal attention has been paid to developing the liberal arts, humanities, and social sciences disciplines, with domestic student admissions to the BA program dramatically declining in recent years (international student admissions are of course growing). In a recent Senate meeting, the campus Principal referred to “a Government direction to stop teaching BAs,” presumably to increase focus on science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) and applied vocation fields such as business, health, and engineering.

Moreover, the 2011 development review also noted “the absence of systematized external reviews of academic programs” at the campus (Development Review, 2011, p. 12) Reviews can be of Faculties, units and departments, and of specific programs e.g. a specific bachelor’s degree. At the time of this developmental review the review team was concerned that no external reviews of any academic unit at any level (e.g. department, unit) or any academic program had ever been undertaken at UBCO. At the Faculty level, despite the 2013 review of UBCO undertaken for the AUCC accreditation process stating: “Faculties are subjected to external reviews approximately every five-six years” (UBC Okanagan 2013 p. 19), by late 2016, only one external academic review has ever been undertaken of any Faculty at UBCO. This was an external review of the Faculty of Education undertaken in UBCO’s first year, 2005-06; “carried out in accordance with normal UBC practice, as mandated by its Board of Governors in the University’s Policies and Procedures Handbook” (UBC Okanagan, 2006, p. 1). No subsequent review of any Faculty at UBCO was undertaken in the next ten-eleven years to late 2016. This was in spite of the quite experimental composition and administrative structure of most of the Faculties, and in spite of the Faculty Council of the Faculty of Arts and Science (by far the largest Faculty on the campus) voting in large majority to have such a review if its Faculty undertaken in 2014, a request that was turned down by the campus senior administrators. External reviews

were undertaken of the Faculties of Management and Health and Social Development in 2017 in order to reappoint their respective Deans to renewed five-year terms.

At the unit and department level, there has been a few sporadic reviews since 2013, at the program level, only one so far, an interesting all-administrative university review of the BA program initiated in 2016 (UBC Okanagan, 2016). Enrolment in the BA at the Vancouver campus had not fallen 2011-2016 at all, but at the UBCO campus it had fallen by around 40 percent. Of course, this was deliberate on the part of the administration, as discussed above. However, in 2016, UBCO senior administration commissioned an external review of the BA program purportedly to try to find out what was wrong with it. One of the members of the team was the Dean of Arts at UBC in Vancouver, whose own BA program was showing no such problems. So, obviously there must be something wrong with the program at UBCO. However nowhere in the review is it mentioned that the reason enrolment in the BA at UBCO was falling was because the UBCO senior administration had engineered it that way. The report noted the declining numbers of student in disciplines such as history and political science, stating that “normal program load FTEs are in decline in too many programs” and suggesting that disciplines such as these need to examine their requirements and curriculum and make them more attractive. The authors of the report did not appear to realize that intake into the BA degree at UBCO was down so dramatically over the last few years, so it is not hard to imagine that enrolment in most programs would also be down! In fact the review was a not-so-thinly-veiled attempt by the senior administration to take the control of the BA program away from the Faculties and into the hands of the administration. Such is the all-administrative university campus. Faculties are the governance bodies empowered by the University Act to govern such academic matters and indeed curriculum is virtually the only thing devolved to the Faculty Councils by the Dean’s Offices (all other affairs of Faculty management are controlled by the Dean’s Office executives, in the largest-by-far Faculty of Arts and Sciences at least). The external review recommended putting the BA curriculum in the hands of an unelected committee controlled by the Principal, Provost, and Deans, which would effectively remove the last remaining power of the Faculty Councils. This is a very telling all-administrative university campus recommendation.

A final aspect of the rise of the all-administrative university and the fall of the faculty highlighted by Ginsberg (2011) is the concept that administrators increasingly see the university not as a place to teach students or to foster controversial debate but as a place to use to attract lucrative external research grants and to produce new bits of knowledge that are useful in the marketplace and saleable there. Hence the obsession with the attraction of external grants and the commercialization of ideas in order to attract royalties. This is the concept of the higher education sector as the “Knowledge Industry” or the modern university campus as the “Knowledge Factory” (Aronwitz, 2000). This attitude among the senior administration at UBCO is also starkly manifest. The campus in just the last year has established an “Egg Industry Chair” who writes reports for the Egg Farmers of Canada organization, and a recent guest blog by the UBCO campus Principal highlighted is a new campus initiative of establishing a “Learning Factory”; an integrated factory and research facility in partnership with Avcorp Industries “a Canadian manufacturer that plays a key role in the Boeing supply chain” that will help “establish Kelowna as an advanced manufacturing hub” (Buszard, 2016) As Ginsberg concludes (2011, p. 199); “faculty members with the temerity to question this state of affairs will, no doubt, be cited for demonstrating a shameful lack of civility.”

Conclusion

The analysis of this paper tends to support the conclusion that the UBCO campus conforms almost perfectly to the description of the all-administrative university and the fall of the faculty of Ginsberg (2011). What are the most egregious examples, from this broad but far from exhaustive and comprehensive survey, of the all-administrative campus? Certainly, refusal of the administration to conduct an external review of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences after a motion was passed by the majority vote of the Faculty Council for such a review must rank as a particularly egregious slap-in-the-face to the notion of shared academic governance at UBCO. The unilateral decision of the UBCO administration that the Faculty of Education could no longer continue as a Faculty, without consultation with Senate, must rank as another particularly egregious example. To that we can add the 2016 *Interprise* fiasco, the weak-to-effectively-non-existent Senate, the weak-to-effectively-non-existent Faculty Councils, the data of Figures 1 and 2 confirming the alarmingly rising “Ginsberg” ratios of staff, particularly M&P staff, to both faculty and students, the largest average class sizes in the province, and the downsizing of the Bachelor of Arts by senior administrative fiat. However, the fact that the Faculty Councils of the two largest Faculties on campus, those of Arts and Sciences, and Critical and Creative Studies, were able to halt progress towards their senior-administration-desired merger into an even disproportionately larger Faculty demonstrates I think that the trend to the all-

administrative university and the fall of the faculty at UBCO is unmistakable, but is not yet totally complete. Time will tell as to whether the trend will continue to its final completion, or begin to ameliorate somewhat.

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